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Abstract  
The overarching aim of the current thesis is to examine the relationship between  
veracity and consistency across multiple recalls provided by a single individual in the context  
of repeated investigative interviews. As a form of communication, deception is a dyadic  process 
which can be examined at two points: sending and receiving. The content of an  interviewee’s 
statement can be examined to determine whether it is consistent over multiple  presentations, 
and a veracity assessor’s judgment-making process can be examined to  determine the influence 
of their personal beliefs about the relationship between consistency  and deception on their 
perception of the interviewee’s statements.   
Chapters II and III examine consistency at the point of sending. In Experiment 1, I  
examined how truth tellers’ and liars’ consistency differed across two phases of an interview  
as a result of strategic responses to manipulated interview techniques. In Experiment 2, two  
types of free recall written interviews were compared from the first interview. After a one  
week delay, truth tellers and liars participated in an oral interview. Across both experiments I  
found little support that objective measuring of could be used to indicate veracity. Chapters 
IV and V of this thesis examine consistency from the receiver’s perspective.  In Experiment 
3, participants were asked to rate a series of interview transcripts for  consistency, based upon 
objective coding criteria for consistency, and to separately make a  holistic consistency 
judgement. In Experiment 4, participants analysed four interview  transcripts and reported 
which factors they found to be indicative of (in)consistencies. Based  on this explanation, I 
created the Layperson’s Understanding of Consistency Key (LUCK)  coding scheme, which 
was then compared to a coding scheme built around the experimental  definition of 
consistency. I found that holistic consistency assessments could predict veracity  where 
objective consistency coding could not (Expt. 3 & 4), suggesting that the lay assessment  
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of consistency relies on features not captured by researcher-generated coding schemes (Expt.  
4).   
This set of experiments is the first to highlight the importance of differentiating between  
the examination of consistency as a sending or receiving pattern. Across the programme of  
research, I found little support for the objective measuring of consistency to infer veracity.  
However, holistic consistency judgements were found to be relatively accurate at  
differentiating between truthful and deceptive statements. In the discussion of the results, I  
consider the applied implications of using consistency to infer veracity, and suggest avenues  
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Part One – Introduction  
Consistency is often influential in credibility assessments in the legal system  
(Reinhardt & Sporer, 2008) with a majority of investigators, judges, and lawyers believing  
that inconsistencies are indicative of deception (Fisher, Brewer, & Mitchell, 2009;  
Vredeveldt, Granhag & van Koppen, 2014). This belief is known as the consistency heuristic  
(Granhag & Strömwall, 1999). When multiple statements are available, observers rely on the  
consistency heuristic as an indicator of veracity more so than any other cue (Strömwall,  
Granhag & Jonsson, 2003). Both laypeople (Krix, Sauerland, Lorei, & Rispens, 2015; Global  
Deception Research Team, 2006) and professionals in the legal system (Bogaard & Meier,  
2017; Strömwall & Granhag, 2003) report similar beliefs regarding the consistency heuristic.  
In the interview room, investigators often report relying on (in)consistency to form opinions  
about an interviewee’s veracity and in turn to develop lines of inquiry (Deeb et al., 2018). In  
the courtroom, lawyers actively try to elicit inconsistencies to discredit witnesses, victims and  
suspects, and judges direct juries to attend to (in)consistencies when assessing statement  
credibility (Fisher et al., 2009).   
The overarching aim of the current thesis is to examine the relationship between  veracity and 
consistency across multiple experiential recalls provided by a single individual in the context 
of investigative interviewing. As deception is a form of communication, it is a  dyadic 
process. The receiver (i.e. the veracity assessor) usually makes a judgement about the  
message (i.e. truth or lie) that is conveyed by the sender (i.e. truth teller or liar). As such, the  
relationship between consistency and deception can be examined from two points: the point  
of sending and the point of receiving. In this thesis I will first examine the content of senders’  
messages to determine whether they are consistent over multiple presentations. Secondly, I  
will examine the influence of receivers’ personal beliefs about the relationship between  
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consistency and deception on their judgement-making process. Experiments 1 and 2 of this  
thesis will examine the relationship between deception and consistency at the point of  
sending. Experiments 3 and 4 will examine the relationship between deception and  
consistency at the point of receiving.   
To date, research has examined four types of consistency (Vredeveldt et al., 2014), (i)  within-
statement consistency (the consistency of details provided within one statement), (ii)  
between-statement consistency (the consistency between multiple statements provided by the  
same individual at different times), (iii) within-group consistency (the consistency between  
statements provided by multiple individuals), and (iv) statement-evidence consistency (the  
consistency between an individual’s statement and additional evidence). When appraising  
different statements from a single suspect, police officers place a similar value on within 
statement inconsistency and between-statement inconsistency (Deeb et al., 2018). Therefore,  
the focus of this thesis will be on statements provided by a single individual and will examine  
both within-statement and between-statement consistency. Within-group consistency and  
statement-evidence consistency are based on a different approach to consistency which  
compares consistency between external information and an individual’s memory of an event.  
This thesis examines consistency across multiple recalls provided by a single individual and,  
as such, I will not discuss within-group or statement-evidence consistency any further.  
There are two main opposing explanations for the relationship between consistency  
and veracity; the consistency heuristic and the repeat versus reconstruct hypothesis (Granhag  
& Strömwall, 1999). This thesis seeks to reconcile the relationship between consistency and  
deception at the point of sending and at the point of receiving in relation to these two  
explanations. But first a definition of consistency. Consistency is explained by the  
Cambridge Dictionary as the quality of always behaving or happening in a similar way. In  
this thesis, I examine consistency in the context of investigative interviewing, where  
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individuals are frequently required to make multiple statements about an event. To  
objectively establish consistency across multiple recalls provided by a single individual,  
researchers usually compare details between different parts of one interview or between  
interviews and classify the details into four categories: repetitions (information that is  
reported in an initial part/interview and then repeated in a subsequent part/interview),  
reminiscences (information that is reported in a subsequent part/interview, but not reported in  
the primary part/interview; sometimes referred to as commissions in deception research),  
omissions (information that is provided during an initial part/interview, but not reported in a  
subsequent part/interview), and contradictions (information provided in the subsequent  
part/interview that directly opposes what was reported in the primary part/interview) (Fisher,  
Vrij, & Leins, 2013). Consistency is increased with the occurrence of repetitions, whereas the  
presence of reminiscences, omissions, and contradictions decreases consistency.   
The consistency heuristic  
The term ‘consistency heuristic’ was coined by Granhag and Strömwall in 1999, and  
describes a commonly held belief about the relationship between deception and consistency.  
That is, the majority of people (including 82% of police officers, 72% of prosecutors, and  
74% of judges) believe that truth tellers’ statements will be more consistent than liars’  
statements (Strömwall & Granhag, 2003). People do not just hold this belief though, they  
report that they use it to inform their veracity judgements too. In a recent study by Masip et  
al. (2018) laypeople and police officers were asked to make veracity judgements of several  
pairs of interviews, and the vast majority (90%) reported basing their judgement on  
(in)consistencies between the two accounts.  
This belief is even encouraged by some; a simple Internet search will return results  
where investigators and training agencies claim that inconsistency in a suspect’s interview is  
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a reliable cue to deception (e.g. Cosmos Compliance, The Linguistic Statement Analysis  
Technique). Some published interrogation manuals report the same belief (e.g. The Reid  
Technique; Buckley, 2000). Even court instructions direct juries to attend to inconsistencies  
in witnesses statements to inform credibility assessments (Sixth Circuit Criminal Pattern Jury  
Instructions, 2019), including the suggestion that inconsistencies can make a statement “less  
believable”, and the instruction for jurors to “ask yourself if [the inconsistency] seemed like  
an innocent mistake, or if it seemed deliberate” (Sixth Circuit Criminal Pattern Jury  
Instructions, 2019, section 1.07, point F). The instruction is not just about what is said on the  
stand though; a note regarding the use of inconsistency states “[point F should be used  
regarding] inconsistent testimony on the stand, or inconsistent out-of-court statements or  
conduct, or both” (emphasis added). Even though the instructions fail to provide any  
direction about what constitutes inconsistency, they direct jurors to consider the consistency  
of statements made by an individual over the course of an entire investigation; where in some  
situations initial statements may have been taken years before the case reaches court.  
There is logic to the consistency heuristic. When a statement does not change, and the  
information is simply repeated, there is little motivation for a credibility assessor to question  
it. However, if an individual fails to report everything they previously reported, and starts to  
omit information, this may lead to questions about the quality of their memory, and doubts  
about the accuracy of the information that was remembered. Also, if someone gives a second  
statement that contradicts what they previously reported, it is reasonable to wonder whether  
the individual was wrong in their initial statement or in their second statement. Likewise, if  
an individual includes reminiscence in subsequent statements, an uninformed credibility  
assessor may wonder why a person’s memory has improved over time, and doubt the validity  
of newly included information.  
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However, the consistency heuristic is actually incongruous with both theoretical and  
empirical research into memory. Memory research suggests that various forms of  
inconsistencies, such as reminiscences and omissions, are common features of truthful  
memory reports (Fisher et al., 2009; Gilbert & Fisher, 2006; Strange, Dysart, & Loftus,  
2015). For example, when honest individuals were interviewed twice about witnessing a  
videotaped mock crime, 98% of truthful participants included reminiscence in their second  
recall (Gilbert & Fisher, 2006). Further, although memory is known to fade over time, this  
fade has little detriment on the accuracy of what is recalled (Evans & Fisher, 2011).  
Despite the common use of the consistency heuristic to inform veracity judgements,  
research typically reports that there is no significant difference between truth tellers’ and  
liars’ consistency across multiple accounts. In fact, where differences are found, liars tend to  
be more consistent than truth tellers (Vredeveldt et al., 2014). Accordingly when veracity  
judgements are made based upon the consistency heuristic, naturally occurring  
inconsistencies in a truth teller’s account may lead a perceiver to falsely believe they are  
being deceived.   
The repeat vs reconstruct hypothesis  
The repeat vs reconstruct hypothesis (Granhag & Strömwall, 1999) is probably the  most 
prominent approach to examining the relationship between consistency and deception.  
According to this hypothesis, liars do not take their credibility for granted and make a  
deliberate effort to appear honest (Granhag, Mac Giolla, Strömwall & Rangmar, 2013). As  
proposed by the consistency heuristic, consistency is an indicator of honesty (Granhag &  
Strömwall, 1999). To achieve the aim of being consistent within an interview or across  
multiple interviews, liars often report that they think back to what they said previously and  
try to repeat this information (Granhag et al., 2013). Meanwhile, it is suggested that truth  
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tellers prioritise consistency to a lesser extent than liars because they are not concerned with  
appearing truthful. They assume their credibility will be correctly identified. This  
assumption has been labelled the illusion of transparency (the concept that one’s inner  
feelings will externally manifest; Gilovich, Savitsky, & Medvec, 1998). Further, truth tellers  
hold just world beliefs (the belief that people get what they deserve, and deserve what they  
get; Lerner, 1980). Truth tellers, therefore, often do not apply a particular strategy to appear  
convincing (Granhag et al., 2013). Instead, the repeat vs reconstruct hypothesis suggests that  
truth tellers go back to their memory of the event and reconstruct the event again. Truth  
tellers’ statements naturally vary over multiple recalls, due to the intrinsic reconstructive  
nature of memory: Information is forgotten and remembered differently at different times  
(Tulving, 1984). As a result of these opposing strategies, liars may appear more consistent  
than truth tellers contrary to what is predicted by the consistency heuristic.  
One of the most salient features of memory in relation to repeated recall is it’s  reconstructive 
nature (Tulving, 2000). An individual’s recall reflects both the contents of the  memory as 
well as the process of retrieval (Tulving, 1983). Therefore, if the retrieval  processes differ 
across multiple attempts (as is the case in investigative settings where  different interview 
questions are asked at different times, using different phrasing, for  different reasons, and by 
different people), the recall account will likely differ, even when the  contents of memory do 
not change. As such, it is expected that truth tellers who recall an  event over several attempts 
will include new details, forget some details, and change their  reporting over time (Odinot, 
Wolters & van Giez, 2013). Meanwhile, it is proposed that liars  adopt an attempted control 
approach to interviews (Vrij, 1998). The attempted control  approach suggests that a liar will 
plan ahead and control their behaviour so they can appear as  normal and credible as possible. 
As a consequence of this, a liar may have rehearsed their  statement (Vrij, 2004). In fact, liars 
often report preparing a strategy before an interview  
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(Hartwig et al., 2010). As a successful liar needs a good memory to be able to remember  
what they reported in previous interviews (Granhag & Strömwall, 2000), adequate planning  
and rehearsal could be used to facilitate increased consistency.   
Research has found support for the repeat vs reconstruct hypothesis across a variety of  
interviewing techniques, including Assessment Criteria Indicative of Deception (Colwell,  
Hiscock-Anisman, Memon, Taylor, & Prewett, 2007) and Strategic Use of Evidence (Luke et  
al., 2013). Leins, Fisher and Vrij (2012) found that 88% of liars reported an attempt to repeat  
their story when being interviewed twice using different interview modalities. Considering  
research into truth tellers’ and liars’ behaviour and self-reported interview strategies, the  
repeat vs reconstruct hypothesis makes sense. However, it is based on the premise that there  
are objective differences in the consistency of truth tellers’ and liars’ accounts – despite  
research frequently showing no reliable significant differences in the number of repetitions,  
reminiscences, omissions or contradictions in across the two types of statement (Vredeveldt  
et al., 2014). Fundamentally, although people often report perceiving differences in the  
consistency of truth tellers’ and liars’ statements, this does not mean that objective  
differences actually exist.  
Perceptions of deception and consistency  
People often overestimate the strength of perceived cues to deception, with people  
expecting far greater differences between truth tellers’ and liars’ behaviours than actually  
exist (Hartwig & Bond, 2011). Furthermore, when examining what cues people report using  
to determine veracity, there is little correlation between what cues people say they use and  
what cues they actually use (Hartwig & Bond, 2011). Therefore, there seems to be a  
substantial discrepancy between the perceived strength of a variety of cues to deception  
(including consistency) and the actual diagnostic value of these cues. Despite the scientific  
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evidence for the diagnostic value of the consistency heuristic being weak, there is still a  
strong belief in, and frequent use of, the heuristic (Bogaard & Meijer, 2017; Granhag &  
Strömwall, 2000, 2001;Vredeveldt et al., 2014). For example, Masip et al. (2018) found that  
laypeople who made veracity judgements on a series of written statements reported utilising  
(in)consistency to detect deception in 90% of the cases. In fact, inconsistencies  
(contradictions) are the most commonly reported verbal cue used to identify deception by  
both laypeople and practitioners (Bogaard, Meijer, Vrij & Merckelbach, 2016).   
People differ in their judgements of whether a given statement is inconsistent.  
Granhag and Strömwall (2000) asked participants to act as lie detectors and to rate a series of  
three videos of the same suspect interrogated on three separate occasions. When the  
subjective cues reported as justification for participants’ veracity-judgements were examined,  
consistency was the most commonly reported cue. Of 125 participants, 78 reported using the  
consistency heuristic in making their veracity judgement. However, 38 of these participants 
reported that they considered the three consecutive statements consistent over time (of which  
37 made a truth judgement), whereas the other 40 participants reported that the three  
consecutive statements were inconsistent over time (of which 35 made a lie judgement).  
Thus, the same series of consecutive statements were considered consistent by some judges,  
and inconsistent by others. This inconsistency in the perception of consistency suggests that  
there are idiosyncratic interpretations of what is or is not consistent, and that a clear  
understanding of how to define consistency is lacking among laypersons.   
It may be possible that the differences in veracity judgements for the same series of  
consecutive statements are due to individual differences between receivers. Veracity  
judgements in interviews are typically subjectively made based upon the receiver’s  
judgement of the sender’s statement. People often have poor introspection skills for complex  
behaviours and, when questioned, are more likely to report implicit, a priori causal theories  
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for their behaviours (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). It has been suggested that people respond to  
questions about cues to deception with reasoned, logical explanations based upon common  
sense expectations of liars’ behaviour, whereas their actual veracity judgement-making is  
guided by intuition and implicit cognitive processes that are outside of the realm of  
introspection and self-awareness (Hartwig & Bond, 2011). Consequently, people are unlikely  
to be able to detail the specific cues that influence their veracity judgement making, and they  
therefore may report using the consistency heuristic due to a lack of insight into their own  
behaviours.  
Consistency and amount of detail provided in accounts  
Fundamentally, as consistency is determined by the details that are reported by  
interviewees across interviews, consistency is inherently influenced by the amount of detail  
that an individual reports at the outset in the initial interview. The more details that are  
reported initially, the more opportunities there are for details to be repeated, omitted, or  
contradicted in a subsequent statement. If fewer details are reported, there are more  
opportunities to expand the subsequent statement by including reminiscences.  
Truth tellers are often found to provide more details than liars (DePaulo et al, 2003).  In 
addition to this, truth tellers have been found to provide more core details (Leal, Vrij,  Deeb, 
& Jupe, 2018), and more verifiable details (Nahari & Vrij, 2014), as well as to provide  
greater reconstructability and realism in their stories than liars (Mac Giolla, Ask, Granhag, &  
Karlsson, 2019). It is thought that these differences in performance arise from deviations in  
the type of demand placed on memory during interviews with liars and truth tellers (Sporer &  
Schwandt, 2006). Furthermore, different strategies are commonly reported by truth tellers  
and liars (Vrij & Granhag, 2012). When truth tellers provide honest reports, they rely on  
existing memory structures, which allows for longer, more elaborate responses. A liar’s task  
22  
is much more cognitively challenging, as they are required to construct, verbalise, and keep  
track of their deceptive account (Dando, Bull, Ormerod, & Sandham, 2013), whilst  
simultaneously supressing the truth, and assessing whether their story is being believed. Liars  
may lack the creativity or cognitive flexibility to fabricate details to an equivalent level to  
that provided by truth tellers, and therefore strategically choose to report shorter, less detailed  
accounts.  
It stands to reason that there are strategic benefits for liars in providing shorter  
deceptive reports. Providing less information means that as an interview progresses there is  
(i) leeway for adaptation and verbal manoeuvre (Dando et al., 2013), (ii) fewer opportunities  
for liars’ statements to contradict evidence, (iii) fewer leads for investigators to pursue which  
could reveal deception (Vrij et al., 2015), and (iv) easier maintenance of consistency, as there  
are fewer details to remember to repeat in follow up interviews.  
Consistency across truthful and deceptive accounts  
Only rarely are reliable differences found between the objective consistency of truth  tellers’ 
and liars’ accounts. For instance, Granhag, Mac Giolla, Sooniste, Strömwall and Liu Jonsson 
(2016) examined statements of true and false intent over repeated interviews.  Participants 
were asked to plan a series of tasks and were led to believe they would complete  these tasks. 
Truth tellers were instructed that they would be required to complete benign tasks  including 
buying a gift for a friend and taking a photo in a photo booth. Liars were instructed that they 
would be required to complete a number of suspicious tasks including placing a  memory 
stick containing “illegal” material on a particular shelf in a particular shop, and so  should 
plan a cover story masking their criminal intentions. All participants were intercepted  before 
having the chance to execute their plans and they were interviewed three times. In the  
interviews, truth tellers were honest about their intentions, whereas liars were required to use  
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their cover story to mask their true intentions. Statements were coded for repetitions,  
reminiscences and omissions, and results showed “striking” similarities between truth tellers’ 
and liars’ accounts (Granhag et al., 2016, pg. 1).  
When differences in consistency are found, there is no reliable pattern across results.  
For example, Strömwall, Granhag and Jonsson (2003) sent pairs of truth telling friends for  
lunch, and asked pairs of lying friends to pretend that they had had lunch together. Each  
member of the truth telling and lying pairs was interviewed on two occasions; immediately  
after the supposed lunch had taken place, and again one week later. Strömwall et al. (2003)  
found that there was no significant difference between truth tellers and liars in the number of  
repetitions or omissions across accounts, however truth tellers reported more reminiscent  
detail in their second interview than did liars. Conversely, Granhag and Strömwall (2002)  
found that liars included significantly more reminiscences than truth tellers when interviewed  
three times over 11 days.  
More recently, Deeb et al. (2017) examined differences in liars' and truth‐tellers'  
statement consistency about two events. Participants were required to view a meeting which  
featured a non-critical event and a critical event. Across two interviews, truth tellers were  
honest about both aspects of the meeting. Liars were honest about the non-critical event,  
however, they were required to lie about the critical event. Overall, no differences were found  
between the number of omissions, reminiscences or contradictions provided by truth tellers  
and liars, however liars’ accounts featured fewer repetitions than truth tellers’ accounts for  
both events. It was suggested that requiring liars to lie about the critical event, but remain  
truthful about the non-critical event, was more cognitively demanding than being honest  
about both events, and therefore this made it harder for liars to maintain consistency across  
their statements. 
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Consistency has also been examined in relation to a variety of interview techniques.  
Leins, Fisher, and Vrij (2012) asked liars and truth tellers either the same questions or  
different questions across two interviews. Half of the participants were asked to use the same  
mode of reporting in both interviews, whereas the other half of participants were required to  
switch from verbally reporting to drawing a sketch (or vice versa). Truth tellers responses  
were considered highly consistent regardless of whether they used the same modality of  
reporting across both interviews or not. Liars were more consistent if the modes of  
responding were the same than if they differed. When liars reported across different  
modalities, they included fewer repetitions and more contradictions. There was no significant  
difference in the number of reminiscences or omissions for truth tellers or liars. It was  
concluded that liars lacked the cognitive flexibility to adapt their reporting across different  
reporting modalities.  
Whilst there was no change in modality, Shaw et al. (2014) also tested cognitive  
flexibility by asking participants to report about a mock security meeting in two phases of an  
interview. In the first phase of the interview, participants were required to recall the event in  
chronological order, whereas in the second phase of the interview, they were asked to recall  
the event in reverse order to either the same or a different interviewer. It was found that liars  
provided significantly fewer repetitions than truth tellers, but only when they spoke to a  
different interviewer in the second phase of the interview. Meanwhile, when the reverse order  
instruction was used in interpreted interviews, liars repeated the same number of details and  
included significantly fewer reminiscences than truth tellers (Ewens, Vrij, Mann, & Leal,  
2015).   
Ironically, there seems to be no consistent pattern of results regarding truth tellers’  and 
liars’ consistency. One explanation for this is that liars do not spontaneously display  
diagnostic cues to deception, and as such specific interview techniques are required to elicit  
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or enhance such cues (Vrij, 2014). Across research studies into consistency and deception, a  
number of different interview techniques have been tested and these interview techniques  
may have elicited consistency in different ways potentially leading to this inconsistent pattern  
of results. Yet contrary to the widely held beliefs of legal professionals and laypeople, the  
corpus of research examining the consistency of truth tellers’ and liars’ statements  
collectively suggest that consistency is not necessarily indicative of truth telling, and  
inconsistency is not necessarily indicative of deception.  
Outline of the thesis  
Previous research has not made a distinction between the points of sending and  
receiving truthful and deceptive accounts. It is therefore built upon the assumption that  
receivers perceive consistency patterns in the same way that they are sent. This programme of  
research seeks to distinguish between the point of sending and the point of receiving to better  
understand the relationship between consistency and deception. As the consistency heuristic  
is reported to be commonly relied upon to inform veracity judgements, I aimed to establish  
whether this belief actually reflects the consistency of truth tellers’ and liars’ statements at  
the point of sending, by examining the number of repetitions, reminiscences, omissions and  
contradictions that are provided across repeated interviews. Furthermore, I examined whether  
the perception of consistency is influenced by the presence of repetitions, reminiscences,  
omissions and contradictions, with a view to determining the applied value of using  
objectively measured consistency to inform veracity judgements.   
Ethics  
All research proposals were evaluated and granted favourable opinion by the  University of 
Portsmouth Science Faculty Ethics Committee (SFEC; Appendix 3). For each  
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experiment, a detailed rationale and explanation of the methodology and method of analysis  
was provided for peer review. Informed Consent forms were provided to all participants to  
read and sign before the experiments commenced. These outlined the procedures, explained  
the nature of the research, clearly stated the right to withdraw at any time, how the data  
would be stored and used, and how participants could obtain the findings of the studies.  
Furthermore, the SFEC favourable opinion reference number and SFEC contact details were  
provided. All data will be kept for a period of at least 10 years, in line with APA guidelines  
and the University’s Data Management guidelines. Participants were all assigned participant  
numbers, so their name is not associated with the data, and anonymised copies of the research  
data sets are publicly available on the Open Science Framework.   
   
Transparency  
Experiments 2, 3, and 4 were pre-registered on the Open Science Framework. Data  for 
Experiment 1 was collected before the author was aware of the Open Science Framework,  
and therefore this study was not pre-registered. To increase the integrity, openness, and  
reproducibility of this thesis, all studies have open materials and open data, available from  
the Open Science Framework repository. Direct links are provided for each study.  
The Experiments  
The following provides a brief overview of the main aims, methodologies, and results  
for each of the experiments. Each experiment addresses the relationship between deception  
and consistency, either from the sender’s or from the perceiver’s perspective.  
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Experiment 1  
In real-life situations, suspects are frequently interviewed numerous times, with  
different interviewers using different techniques and they are asked different questions about  
the same event (Miller & Stiff, 1993). The aim of this study was to establish whether using  
different interviewers and different interview techniques would elicit differences in  
consistency between truth tellers and liars. Consistency is of particular importance in  
interview settings, as it is commonly utilised by interviewers to infer honesty and deception 
(Deeb et al., 2018). Experiment 1 focuses on examining the amount of detail and consistency  
of detail provided by truth tellers (n = 80) and liars (n = 80) over two phases of an interview.  
At interview, truth tellers discussed a documentary that they had watched. Liars were tasked  
with stealing a USB stick, containing confidential information, from a laboratory. The liars  
did not watch the documentary. At interview, the liars were asked to discuss the  
documentary, as if they had watched it, and to conceal the fact that they had stolen the USB  
stick.  
In the initial phase of the interview, the interviewer asked participants to provide their  
statement in chronological order. After a short break, the second phase of the interview  
began. Either the same person who had conducted the first phase of the interview (same  
interviewer condition, n = 79), or another interviewer (different interviewer condition, n =  
81) entered the room. Participants were asked to provide their statement again. Half of the  
interviews were conducted using the same questions as in the first phase (n = 81), whereas  
the remainder of the interviews were conducted using the reverse order recall technique (n =  
79).  
As the reverse order recall instruction disrupts the recollection of events from a  schema 
(Gilbert & Fisher, 2006), I hypothesised that reverse order recall prompts would elicit  more 
reminiscent details than chronological order interviews for truth tellers, but would not  
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affect the amount of reminiscent detail reported by liars due to their concerns about  
consistency (Hartwig et al., 2007). I also predicted that truth tellers would include more  
repetitions and fewer omissions when interviewed by a different interviewer in phase two of  
their interview than when interviewed by the same interviewer across both phases, as it was  
anticipated that they would not want to bore the same interviewer by telling the same report  
again (as opposed to a different interviewer who had not yet heard their report). In contrast, I  
hypothesised that liars would include more repetitions and fewer omissions when interviewed  
by the same interviewer in phase two of their interview than when interviewed by a different  
interviewer as they were aware that the same interviewer had heard their previous statement  
and could more easily cross-compare for consistency.   
It was found that truth tellers provided more details overall, and more reminiscent  
details than liars but there were no differences between veracity groups for the number of  
omissions made or repetitions reported. There was also no evidence that the reverse order  
recall or change interviewer manipulations induced inconsistencies in liars. In sum, I found   
little support that consistency (or a lack thereof) could be used as a diagnostic cue to  
deception, and that due to the natural occurrence of reminiscences in truth tellers’ statements,  
liars appeared slightly more consistent than truth tellers.  
Experiment 2   
In Experiment 1, I found truth tellers provided more details than liars. Previous  research has 
suggested that liars lack the imagination to fabricate details to an equivalent  level to that 
provided by truth tellers (Vrij, Hope, & Fisher, 2014), and tend to report as little  information 
as possible to reduce the opportunity for contradicting themselves in subsequent  interviews 
(Vredeveldt, van Koppen & Granhag, 2014). In Experiment 2, I examine how  maximising 
the amount of detail reported by liars (n = 64) and truth tellers (n = 64) in their  
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first recall might impact their consistency after a delay of seven days. The primary aim of this  
study was to investigate whether differences can be elicited between truth tellers’ and liars’  
statement consistency by encouraging liars to commit to more detail in their initial  
interviews. Both truth tellers and liars were asked to watch the same first-person perspective  
video of a crime but were either instructed to honestly report what they saw, or deliberately  
mislead authorities about the perpetrator of the crime.  
Truth tellers and liars were asked to either complete a written free recall (WFR; n =  
64) or the Self-Administered Interview (SAI; n = 64). The SAI is a questionnaire booklet that  
draws on theory and empirical research into memory to elicit a comprehensive, detailed free  
recall, using the witness’ own words. One week later, participants returned for a verbal  
interview. As research indicates that (i) the SAI elicits more details than a written free recall  
(Gabbert, Hope, & Fisher, 2009), (ii) truth tellers report more details than liars (Amado et al.,  
2016; DePaulo et al., 2003), and (iii) there is little difference in the consistency of truth  
tellers’ and liars’ accounts, (Granhag & Strömwall, 2002; Granhag, Strömwall & Jonsson,  
2003; Granhag, Mac Giolla, Strömwall, Sooniste & Liu-Jonsson, 2016), I was interested in  
how veracity and written interview format influence the level of detail and consistency of  
witnesses’ reports.  
It was predicted that the truth tellers would include significantly more reminiscences 
and repetitions in their second interview than liars if they initially completed the SAI, and  
that all participants completing the SAI would include significantly more details than those  
completing a WFR. Furthermore, I predicted that statements provided by truth tellers 
completing the SAI would have significantly higher accuracy rates than statements provided  
by truth tellers completing the WFR.   
In contrast to Experiment 1, I found that truth tellers omitted and repeated more  
information in their subsequent interview than liars, however there was no significant  
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difference in the number of reminiscent details reported. Whilst I found that participants who  
completed the SAI reported more details in their initial account than participants who  
completed the WFR, the SAI (cf. WFR) affected truth tellers' and liars' consistency equally. I  
concluded that whilst the SAI is an effective information-gathering tool, it did not facilitate  
the detection of deception to any greater level than the WFR.  
Experiment 3  
Considering that Experiments 1 and 2 suggest that there are no differences between  
truth tellers’ and liars’ consistency, Experiment 3 examines whether people truly base their  
veracity decisions on perceived statement consistency. Whilst there is a large body of  
research showing that people generally believe that inconsistency is indicative of deception,  
identifying consistency in a series of consecutive statements is found to be subjective. The  
aim of this study was to examine whether people utilise the consistency heuristic when  
making veracity judgements. Our primary research question was; do people’s beliefs about  
consistency as a cue to deception influence their veracity judgements? Participants (N = 285)  
were asked to report their beliefs about a variety of cues to deception, before making veracity  
judgements about a series of paired statements. They were also asked to rate the paired  
statements for perceived amount of detail, holistic consistency between the statements,  
number of repetitions, number of omitted details, number of reminiscent details, and number  
of contradictions.   
Taking into consideration the widely reported use of consistency to inform veracity  
judgements (Granhag & Strömwall, 2007; Masip et al., 2018), it was predicted that  
participants would use the consistency heuristic to inform their veracity judgements, such that  
statements perceived to be higher in consistency would be rated significantly more truthful  
than statements perceived to be lower in consistency. Truth tellers provided more details than  
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liars in Experiments 1 and 2, so I predicted that statements that were perceived as more  
detailed would be rated as more truthful than statements that were perceived as lower in  
detail. Combining these two considerations, it was further predicted that statements perceived  
to be both higher in consistency and higher in detail would be considered significantly more  
truthful than statements that were perceived to be both lower in consistency and lower in  
detail. Furthermore, it was predicted that participants would prioritise the consistency  
heuristic over amount of detail in their veracity decision-making, as it is the most commonly  
reported perceived cue to deception of the two. I thus predicted that statements that were  
perceived to be higher in consistency and lower in detail would be considered significantly  
more truthful than statements that were perceived to be lower in consistency and higher in  
detail. Finally, research suggests that not all participants interpret cues equally (Granhag &  
Strömwall, 2000). Therefore, it was predicted that significantly more variability in veracity  
ratings would be accounted for by individual factors of the participant rating the statement  
than by level of detail and level of consistency within statements.   
I found that when participants made a higher rating for holistic consistency, I could  predict 
that they would make an overall truthful judgement for the statement, and also that  the 
statement that they were rating was actually a truthful statement. However, participants’  
judgements for amount of detail, repetitions, omissions, reminiscences or contradictions  
could not be used to predict the veracity condition of the statement they were judging. A lens  
model showed that whilst perceptions of repetitions, omissions, contradictions and amount of  
detail influenced veracity judgements, these perceptions (and overall veracity judgements)  
did not represent the veracity conditions, or expert veracity coding of the statements.  
Therefore, there was a discrepancy between how laypeople identified consistency and how  
experts coded for consistency. Furthermore, no strong correlations were found between self 
reported reliance on cues and actual usage of cues, suggesting that participants were not  
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basing their decisions on what they reported as being important cues to deception. It was  
concluded that individuals do not understand the cues they personally use to make veracity  
decisions, and that a holistic perception of consistency could facilitate accurate veracity  
judgements.  
Experiment 4  
In Experiment 3, I found that experts, with dedicated time and resources, who code  
statements for consistency do not refer to the same aspects of the statement as laypersons  
when they identify ‘consistency’. Therefore, it could be that the academic conceptualisation  
of consistency does not align with laypersons’ understanding of consistency. Experiment 4,  
Part 1 aimed to examine what laypeople mean when they report using consistency to inform  
their veracity judgements. Participants identified the key aspects of a statement that they use  
to characterise (in)consistency. Our primary aim was to determine which key aspects of a  
statement characterise (in)consistency for laypeople.  
Participants (N = 20) were provided with a set of four different statement pairs about a  
memorable event and were asked to rate the holistic consistency for each pair of statements (a  
total of 80 judgements). Once the participants had made their judgements, they were then  
asked to highlight the key aspects of the statement pair that they used to inform their  
consistency judgement and to add notes to explain how that aspect of the statement informed  
their perception of consistency. I found that participants rated truthful statements as  
significantly more holistically consistent than deceptive statements, but that no significant  
differences between truthful and deceptive statements emerged for the number of repetitions,  
omissions, reminiscences, or contradictions. I conducted a thematic analysis of the statements  
and comments to reveal the themes that defined participants’ understanding of consistency  
and I identified four major themes that contribute to the layperson understanding of  
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consistency: Core Information, General Information, Logic, and Narrative. From this, a new  
coding scheme was developed (Layperson Understanding of Consistency Key; LUCK) to test  
whether laypeople’s approach to measuring consistency can be operationalised and used to  
facilitate discrimination between truthful and deceptive statements to a greater level than  
current coding schemes (Phase 2).   
Before Phase 1, independent participants were asked to provide two reports about a  
memorable event e.g. birthday party, wedding, holiday. Participants were randomly assigned  
to either tell the truth or lie about the memorable event. In Phase 2, six coders, blind to the  
veracity of the statements, were trained in the LUCK coding scheme and were asked to rate  
20 truthful and deceptive statements (a total of 120 observations) using the LUCK criteria. As  
well as using the LUCK coding scheme, the coders also coded these 20 statements for  
number or repetitions, reminiscences, omissions, and contradictions (the four features of  
consistency). I compared the LUCK coding scheme with ratings for the four features of  
consistency to determine whether it is possible to accurately determine statement veracity by  
coding for consistency. Experiment 4 was an exploratory study, and as such I did not  
formulate any hypotheses.   
No significant difference in the consistency scores emerged using the LUCK coding  scheme 
nor when counting the four features of consistency. While, in Phase 1, I was able to  
establish what aspects of a statement inform holistic consistency judgements made by  
laypeople, the coding scheme derived from this information did not facilitate discrimination  
between truthful and deceptive statements in the same way that a holistic consistency  
judgement does. In sum, the thematic analysis suggests that laypeople use context and  
meaning to inform their consistency judgements, rather than sterile categorisations of details  
as (in)consistent. The reduction of the complex construct of consistency down to atomistic  
units (as is done with coding schemes) resulted in a failure to capture meaningful aspects of  
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complex social behaviours. It was concluded that it may be that holistic consistency  
judgements are too complex to be reduced to a relatively simplistic coding scheme based  
upon current understanding of the use of consistency to assess veracity.  
General Discussion  
In the general discussion, I provide an overview of the key findings from the four  
experiments, and consider how they contribute to our understanding of the relationship  
between consistency and deception. I discuss the theoretical implications of differentiating 
between the point of sending and receiving when examining consistency, and the practical  
impact of the interviewer, the effect of interview modality, and the applied value of  
consistency to inform veracity judgements. I address some of the limitations of the current  
experiments and wider field, as well as presenting suggestions for future research in light of  
this programme of study. Finally, I conclude this chapter with recommendations relating to 
the interpretation and use of consistency to inform veracity decisions in applied settings. 
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Part Two – Consistency at the point of sending  
Chapter II  
The devil is in the detail: Deception and consistency over repeated interviews.  
Abstract  
Research indicates that truthful statements typically contain more details than fabricated  
statements, and that truth tellers are no more consistent than liars over multiple interviews. In  
this experiment, we examine the impact of (i) multiple interviewers and (ii) reverse order  
recall on liars’ and truth tellers’ consistency and amount of reported detail over repeated  
recall attempts. Participants either took part in a mock crime (lying condition) or an innocent  
event (truth telling condition) which they were subsequently interviewed about in two  
separate interview phases. Truth tellers provided more details overall, and more reminiscent  
details than liars. There were no differences between veracity groups for the number of  
omissions made or repetitions reported. Despite the popular belief that inconsistency is a cue  
to deception, we found little support for the notion that consistency (or lack of consistency)  
offers a diagnostic cue to deception. We found little evidence that switching interviewer or  
recalling in reverse order induced inconsistencies in liars. In fact, due to the number of  
reminiscent details in truth tellers’ accounts, our findings suggest that accounts provided by  
liars tend to be slightly more consistent than those provided by truth tellers. Materials for this  
paper can be found at osf.io/hgvmk/. 
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Introduction  
Research has consistently shown that people are relatively poor at recognising when  
someone is lying (Hartwig et al., 2011; ten Brinke, Vohs, & Carney, 2016). Meta-analyses  
reveal that humans’ ability to detect deception rarely exceeds chance (Bond & DePaulo,  
2006), and that there is little difference in accuracy between laypeople and practitioners who  
work in fields where attempts to deceive are commonplace (Aamodt & Custer, 2006; Bond &  
DePaulo, 2006). Even when investigators are trained to look for cues to deception, only a  
small to medium training effect for accuracy in distinguishing between truth tellers and liars  
is found with the largest effect sizes found for training that focuses on verbal content (Hauch,  
Sporer, Michael, & Meissner, 2016).  
Given people’s poor ability to differentiate between truth tellers and liars, researchers  
have been working towards developing interviewing techniques designed to increase the  
differences in verbal cues between truth tellers and liars (e.g. Strategic Use of Evidence,  
SUE; Granhag & Hartwig, 2015) and cognitive lie detection (Vrij, Fisher, & Blank, 2017;  
Vrij, Leal, Mann, Vernham, & Brankeart, 2015). In the current experiment, we examined the  
effect of two interviewing strategies (requests for reverse order reporting and changing the  
interviewer midway through an interview) on truth tellers’ and liars’ reports over two phases  
of an interview (i.e. two questioning periods with a short break in between), with respect to  
the amount of detail provided, and the consistency between the two recall attempts. 
Veracity: detail and (in)consistency  
Truth tellers tend to provide more details in their accounts than liars (Amado, Arce, &  
Fariña, 2015; Vrij, 2008; Vrij, Mann, Jundi, Hillman, & Hope, 2014). In comparison to liars,  
truth tellers provide more verifiable details (Nahari & Vrij, 2014), core details (Leal, Vrij,  
Deeb, & Jupe, in press) and complications (Vrij, Leal, Jupe, & Harvey, 2018), and present 
greater reconstructability and realism in their stories (Mac Giolla, Ask, Granhag, & Karlsson,  
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2019). These differences are thought to stem from discrepancies in the nature of demand on  
memory for truth tellers and liars (Sporer & Schwandt, 2006) and from different strategies  
used by truth tellers and liars (Vrij & Granhag, 2012). Individuals providing an honest report  
can draw from existing memory structures, allowing them to provide longer, more elaborate  
responses. Meanwhile liars face the more cognitively challenging task of constructing,  
verbalising, and keeping track of their deceptive accounts (Dando, Bull, Ormerod, &  
Sandham, 2013). There are also strategic benefits associated with shorter deceptive reports.  
For instance, providing less information means (i) there are fewer opportunities for liars to  
contradict themselves as evidence emerges through an interview (Hartwig, Granhag,  
Strömwall, & Kronkvist, 2006), (ii) there are fewer leads for investigators to pursue which  
could reveal deception (Vrij et al., 2015), (iii) there is leeway for verbal manoeuvring and  
adaptation as the interview progresses (Dando et al., 2013), and (iv) it is easier to maintain  
consistency, as there are fewer details to remember to repeat in follow up interviews.   
Consistency has been conceptualised in a number of ways relevant to the criminal  justice 
system (for an overview, see Vredeveldt, van Koppen, & Granhag, 2014). For  instance, 
within-group consistency refers to the comparison of statements provided by  multiple 
suspects (Granhag, Strömwall, & Jonsson, 2003), whereas statement-evidence  consistency is 
the evaluation of a suspect’s statement in relation to any gathered evidence  (Granhag & 
Hartwig, 2015). Individual statements can be examined to establish the  consistency within 
them (within-statement consistency; Leins, Fisher, Vrij, Leal, & Mann,  2011). However, in 
investigations, suspects are often interrogated multiple times (Granhag &  Strömwall, 1999; 
Kassin et al., 2007; Miller & Stiff, 1993) which allows for the comparison  of multiple 
statements provided by a single suspect on a number of different occasions  (between-
statement consistency). When examining different statements from a single suspect,  
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police have reported that they place a similar value on within-statement inconsistency and  
between-statement inconsistency (Deeb et al., 2018).   
The ‘repeat versus reconstruct’ hypothesis (Granhag & Strömwall, 1999) is probably  
the most prominent approach to examining the relationship of statement consistency and  
veracity in the lie detection literature. This hypothesis contends that, for liars, being  
consistent is an important aim in interviews. Over multiple interviews, reported details can be  
compared and classified into four categories in order to quantify consistency; repetition,  
omissions, reminiscences (sometimes referred to as commissions in deception research) and  
contradictions1(Fisher, Vrij, & Leins, 2013).   
In repeated interviews, it is hypothesised that liars think back to their earlier  
statements and try to repeat the same information to achieve their aim of being consistent. In  
contrast, truth tellers are thought to be less concerned with consistency between statements  
(Hartwig, Granhag, & Strömwall, 2007) and more focused on remembering and reporting the  
encoding event. They are therefore less likely to focus on what was said in a previous  
interview, but more likely to think back to the originally encoded event and try to recall this  
event again, hereby generating reminiscent details and potentially omitting previously  
reported details (Granhag & Strömwall, 1999; Granhag et al., 2003).   
The occurrence of repetitions (information that is provided across all interviews or  phases of 
an interview) increases apparent consistency, while the occurrence of omissions  
(information that is provided during a primary interview, but not mentioned in a subsequent  
interview) and reminiscences (information that is provided in a subsequent interview, but not  
provided in the primary interview) decrease consistency. Perceptions of consistency can  
mediate credibility judgments (Reinhard & Sporer, 2008) and observers often utilise   
1 Contradictions rarely occur in experimental research (e.g. Granhag et al., 2003) and will not be discussed  
further. 
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statement consistency as a cue to deception (de Keijser, Malsch, Kranendonk, & de Gruijter,  
2012; Roos af Hjelmsäter, Öhman, Granhag, & Vrij, 2014). When individuals are tasked with  
assessing the veracity of consecutive statements given by one suspect, the most commonly  
reported cue sought is consistency (Granhag & Strömwall, 2000, 2001), with 82% of police  
officers believing that truthful consecutive statements are more consistent than deceptive  
ones (Strömwall & Granhag, 2003). Lay people express similar views about the relationship  
between consistency and deception (Krix, Sauerland, Lorei, & Rispens, 2015; The Global  
Deception Research Team, 2006). This tendency has been referred to as the ‘consistency  
heuristic’ (Granhag & Strömwall, 2000). However, research demonstrating the malleability  
and reconstructive nature of memory (Bartlett, 1920; Hemmer & Steyvers, 2009; Michaelian,  
2013) is incongruent with the consistency heuristic. With respect to statement consistency,  
memory research suggests that some types of inconsistency are a common feature of memory  
reports (Fisher, Brewer, & Mitchell, 2009; Strange, Dysart, & Loftus, 2015), with both  
reminiscences and omissions occurring without any detrimental effect on overall accuracy  
(Gilbert & Fisher, 2006; Odinot, Memon, La Rooy, & Millen, 2013). Consequently, in some  
situations, the consistency heuristic could be misleading, and cause a receiver to believe that  
such inconsistencies in an account might indicate that they are being deceived.   
Protocols designed to actively elicit and magnify statement consistency as a useful  
cue to deception are still relatively understudied in lie detection research (Granhag, Mac  
Giolla, Sooniste, Strömwall, & Liu-Jonsson, 2016; Vredeveldt et al., 2014). However,  
research examining unanticipated questions (Granhag & Mac Giolla, 2014) and changing  
interview modality, from verbal descriptions to drawing a sketch of a restaurant layout (Leins  
et al., 2011) or of a particular room (Leins, Fisher, & Vrij, 2012) indicates that within 
statement consistency of suspects can be magnified by introducing specific proactive  
interview protocols, resulting in diagnostic cues to deception. 
40  
Practitioners often encourage applied researchers to examine the impact of using  
multiple techniques together, particularly when the techniques have already been tested  
individually. To address this, in the current experiment we introduced two different changes  
in interview format and examined their effects on liars’ and truth tellers’ accounts:  
introducing a request for a reverse order recall, similar to Vrij, Leal, Mann, and Fisher (2012)  
and switching the interviewer for a different interviewer, similar to Shaw et al. (2014).  
Combining these two techniques, which have both independently shown promise with respect  
to increasing the amount of detail provided by truth tellers, could magnify the difference in  
truth tellers’ and liars’ performance to a level diagnostic of deception.   
The reverse order recall strategy was initially developed to support memory retrieval  
as part of the Cognitive Interview (CI). Use of this technique may trigger recollection of  
additional details following a traditional chronological recall of an event (Fisher &  
Geiselman, 1992). The reverse order recall instruction has been found to provide  
unsatisfactory results in some eyewitness interviews (Davis, McMahon, & Greenwood, 2005;  
Memon, Wark, Bull, & Koehnken, 1997), resulting in suggestions by some that it should be  
removed from the CI (Davis et al., 2005).   
Vrij et al. (2008) interviewed 80 mock suspects about stealing £10 from a wallet. Half  of the 
sample were innocent and were instructed to tell the truth about their actions, whereas  the 
other half of the sample were guilty and were instructed to lie about their actions.  
Participants were asked to give their accounts in either chronological or reverse order. Liars  
who were asked to recall events in reverse order displayed more signs of cognitive load (e.g.  
spoke at a slower rate and provided fewer auditory details) than truth tellers, however the  
same effects were not found for those who recalled in chronological order. This suggests that  
when the reverse order recall technique is applied for liars, it results in additional cognitive  
load, as they try to work backwards through what they have previously reported (Vrij et al.,  
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2008). The change in recall order makes it more difficult for liars (cf. truthtellers) to monitor  
their consistency, as this unexpected method of questioning requires cognitive flexibility – a  
challenge for liars, who typically rehearse their deceptive accounts in a unidimensional  
manner (Leins et al., 2011). Consequently, increase in cognitive load as a result of reverse  
order recall should have a larger impact on liars than on truth tellers and thus should magnify  
the differences between them to a level that is diagnostic of deception.   
In legal situations individuals may be interviewed a number of times by a range of  
individuals for example, police officers, social workers and lawyers. Research has suggested  
that using the same or different interviewers across repeated interviews has no effect on the  
accuracy of reported details (Odinot et al., 2013). However, previous research examining the  
effect of switching interviewers during an interview on cues to deceit found that a different  
interviewer (vs the same interviewer) in a second phase of an interview resulted in truth  
tellers providing more details, and liars providing fewer details (Shaw et al., 2014). The  
participants in Shaw et al.’s (2014) research were interviewed by two interviewers about a  
mock security meeting that they had attended. In half of the interviews, new interviewers  
took over the interview half way through (the ‘changed interviewer’ condition). Otherwise,  
the same two interviewers conducted the entire interview (‘same interviewer’ condition).  
During the first half of the interviews, participants were required to provide their account in  
chronological order. In the second half of the interviews, participants were asked to provide a  
reverse order recall. It was found that differences in performance between truth tellers and  
liars were most prominent in the ‘changed interviewer’ condition, where truth tellers  
provided more detail and more repetitions in the second half of the interview than liars. This  
was not the case for the ‘same interviewer’ condition.   
A new interviewer (vs the original interviewer) may motivate truth tellers to repeat  
more and omit fewer details because this new interviewer has not heard their story yet. In  
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contrast, a switch in interviewers may make liars less motivated to be consistent (and  
therefore less motivated to repeat information) because it is more difficult for a new  
interviewer (cf. the original interviewer) to confirm consistency between two interviews.   
In the current experiment, we asked liars and truth tellers to provide two accounts,  
across two phases of an interview, with a short break in between. All participants were asked  
to give a free recall of their actions in the first interview phase. After the break, either the  
same or a different interviewer asked the participants to report their account again, either as a  
free recall or using the reverse order recall instruction. As the two accounts were taken within  
the same interviewing session, we examined the within-statement consistency between the  
two accounts.   
Most lie-detection studies involve assignment of participants to lie-telling conditions  (Vrij, 
2008). As these participants may lack the motivation and arousal of individuals who  are lying 
of their own volition (Fisher & Perez, 2007), we instead attempted to increase the  ecological 
validity of our experimental paradigm by allowing participants to select whether  they would 
tell the truth or lie (Wachi et al., 2017). Providing participants with the option to  lie or tell the 
truth has been implemented in a variety of investigations into deceptive  behaviour (Gneezy, 
2005; Talwar & Lee, 2008; Tyler, Feldman, & Reichert, 2006), however,  we recognise 
problematic features sometimes associated with this methodology. Whilst  research has 
suggested that males and females lie with equal frequency (DePaulo, Kashy,  Kirkendol, 
Wyer, & Epstein, 1996), there is also evidence to suggest a gender difference in  
predisposition to lie, with research suggesting men are more likely to lie than women (Dreber  
& Johannesson, 2008), as well as the inverse (Tyler et al., 2006). Furthermore, there is data to  
suggest younger people lie more than older individuals (DePaulo et al., 1996), with college  
students telling more lies per day than community members. For this reason, we carefully  
checked for the effect of gender and age across our truth telling and lie telling groups.  
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Based on previous literature (Amado et al., 2015; Gilbert & Fisher, 2006; Granhag et  
al., 2003; Vrij, 2008; Vrij et al., 2014), we hypothesised that truth tellers would provide more  
details than liars in the first phase of their interviews (Hypothesis 1a) and more reminiscences  
than liars in the second phase of their interviews (Hypothesis 1b). As liars are more  
concerned about appearing consistent than truth tellers (Hartwig et al., 2007), it was further  
predicted that liars would make fewer omissions (Hypothesis 2a) and more repetitions  
(Hypothesis 2b) in the second stage of their interviews than truth tellers. We also predicted  
that truth tellers would include more repetitions and fewer omissions when interviewed by a  
different interviewer in phase two of an interview than when interviewed by the same  
interviewer (Hypothesis 3a). In contrast, we hypothesised liars would include more  
repetitions and fewer omissions when interviewed by the same interviewer in phase two of an  
interview than when interviewed by a different interviewer (Hypothesis 3b). People’s  
recollection is partially influenced by the retrieval cues that they use to search their memory,  
and the reverse order recall instruction disrupts the recollection of events from a schema  
(Gilbert & Fisher, 2006). Therefore, we predicted that reverse order recall prompts would  
elicit more reminiscent details than chronological order interviews for truth tellers, but would  
not affect the amount of reminiscent detail reported by liars (Hypothesis 4), due to their  
concerns about consistency (Hartwig et al., 2007). Finally, we predicted that liars would  
include fewer repetitions and more omissions in reverse order recall attempts than in  
chronological order recall attempts, whereas this manipulation would not affect truth tellers’  




A total of 160 participants (49 male, 109 female, and 2 non-binary, with ages ranging  
from 18 years to 68 years, M = 24.09 years, SD = 9.93 years) were recruited from a university  
in the United Kingdom (126 participants were undergraduate students). Opportunity sampling  
was used for convenience. Participants received either extra course credit as part of a research  
participation scheme or £5 compensation if they were not eligible for course credit.  Design  
We used a 2 × 2 × 2 × 2 mixed design, with Veracity (truth teller vs liar), Order of  
Recall (chronological order recall vs reverse order recall) and Interviewer (same second  
interviewer vs different second interviewer) as between subject factors, and Interview Phase  
(i.e. detail reported in Phase 1 vs detail reported in Phase 2) as a within-subject factor.  
Interviews were transcribed for analysis, and the number of details in each phase, and the  
repetitions, omissions and reminiscences found in Phase 2 were analysed as the dependent  
variables.  
Materials  
Stimulus materials. Truth tellers were asked to watch a BBC nature documentary  
clip. The documentary concerned caterpillar and butterfly survival, lasted 6 min and 32 s, and  
was rich in visual and narrative detail. A single page written synopsis of the documentary  
was also prepared in the style of a review (462 words).  
Post interview questionnaires. Two questionnaires were presented to participants  after 
they had finished both phases of their interview. One questionnaire focused on  
participants’ demographic details (age, gender identification, profession), the other  
questionnaire asked about how well participants remembered what they had done (i.e. the  
tasks they had completed) and how they perceived the interview process. Nine questions  
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included 7 point Likert scales (1 = not at all to 7 = completely) regarding how much they  
remembered of the tasks they completed, their motivation to be believed, and the extent to  
which they thought they were believed. Two open-ended questions asked participants to  
report on the strategies they adopted when providing their accounts. The questionnaires can  
be found at osf.io/ kx82u/.  
Procedure  
Pre-interview instructions. After giving consent, participants were then presented  with two 
envelopes; one labelled ‘liar’ and the other labelled ‘truth teller’. They were  informed that 
each envelope contained a set of keys to a room on the second floor of the  building they were 
in, and a set of instructions regarding the tasks that they would be asked to  complete, and 
then either later lie about in an interview (the ‘liar’ condition), or tell the truth  about (the 
‘truth teller’ condition). They were told that the instructions asked liars to steal a  USB stick 
from an empty room, whereas truth tellers would be asked to watch a short nature  
documentary in an empty room. The researcher then left the room to give the participants  
time to decide which envelope (and, therefore, task) to select. They then placed the other  
envelope into a metal tin. Participants were informed that the researcher would not know  
which condition they chose until after they had completed the experiment. The majority of  
participants (n = 130) selected their preferred experimental condition in this way.2  
Following the written instructions in the envelope truth tellers went alone to a  
research room and accessed a link to the nature documentary on a computer. Once the  
documentary was finished, truth tellers then logged out of the computer, and returned to the  
room in which they had originally met the researcher.   
2 To correct for imbalances in the sample size between conditions, some participants signed up for the  
experiment having read an advert about solely the ‘liar’ condition (n = 30), and thus were not provided with the  
option to choose the ‘truth teller’ envelope. All truth tellers chose their condition (n = 87). Analyses to check for  
the presence of confounds differences between those who chose to lie compared to (i) those who chose to tell  
the truth and (ii) those who were given no choice but to lie are presented in the results section. 
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In contrast, but also following written instructions, liars were directed to another room  
where they were asked to steal a classified USB stick. They were informed that the USB stick  
contained important computer coding regarding the privacy and safety of the University’s  
intranet firewall, and they were asked to log on using stolen credentials to check the code  
before returning to the researcher. Liars were also provided with an outline of the nature  
documentary that they were informed truth tellers would watch. It was suggested that this  
synopsis might help them to claim as an alibi, during their interviews, that they were  
watching the documentary. Procedures where liars are provided with information they might  
use for an alibi (often a task completed by participants in a truth-telling condition) are  
common in deception research (e.g. Nahari & Vrij, 2014; Granhag, Strömwall & Jonsson,  
2003). Once the liars had completed the tasks on the computer and logged off, they were also  
instructed to return to the room in which they had originally met the researcher.   
When participants returned they were then taken through to the interview room. 
The interview. Interviews were conducted by two male interviewers blind to the  
participants’ veracity status. All participants were interviewed individually. All interviews  
were recorded using a digital recorder. A copy of the interview script is available at  
osf.io/dxfas/.   
The first phase of each interview lasted on average 3 min and 33 s (SD = 1 min 41 s).  
Participants were not offered preparation time, and were told that they needed to convince the  
interviewer that they could not have stolen the USB device, as they had been watching the  
nature documentary. Firstly, the interviewer introduced himself, before informing the  
participants that some classified data had just been stolen. Participants were then asked to  
recall what they had been doing for the past 10 min. As expected, all participants claimed to  
have been watching a nature documentary. A second question asked participants to describe  
the documentary in chronological order, without guessing, and including as much detail as  
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possible. Interviewers were instructed not to interrupt participants, or verbalise any  
encouragement, but could nod to indicate they were paying attention.   
After participants had finished describing the documentary, they were thanked and  
asked to wait in the same room with the instruction that ‘someone will be with you shortly’.  
Participants were left unattended for 3 min, before the second phase of each interview began.  
At this point, either the same person who conducted the first phase of the interview (same  
interviewer condition, n = 79), or another interviewer (different interviewer condition, n =  
81) entered the room. Participants were informed that there had been a problem with their  
previous statement, and that they needed to provide their report about the documentary again.  
Half of the participants received the same free recall instruction as in the first phase (i.e.  
chronological order, include as much detail as possible, don’t guess, n = 81), whereas the  
remainder of the interviewees were asked to recall the documentary in reverse order (n = 79).  
For the ‘reverse order’ condition, the interviewer explained what recalling the events in  
reverse order meant, and then participants were given an example of how one would describe  
making a cup of tea in reverse order. The interviewer asked the participants to confirm that  
they understood what was required, before instructing them to include as much detail as  
possible without guessing. The second phase of the interview lasted on average 3 min and 6 s  
(SD = 1 min 36 s).   
Post interview instructions. Once the interviews were complete, participants were  
asked to fill in the two post interview questionnaires, and to be completely honest in their  
responses. Following this they were fully debriefed, paid or awarded credits, and thanked for  
their time.  
Coding of interview transcripts  
All audio recorded interviews were transcribed for analysis. Each interview transcript  
was first coded for number of details provided. (e.g. ‘the video had a white male narrating’  
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would contain three details; the descriptors ‘white’ and ‘male’, and the action ‘narrating’).  
Then, following Fisher et al. (2013), each detail provided in the second phase of the inter view 
was coded for consistency. Repetitions were details reported in both phases of the  interview, 
omissions were details reported in the first phase but not in the second phase of the  
interviews, reminiscences were details reported in the second phase but not in the first phase  
of the interviews, and contradictions were details reported in the first phase that were  
reported differently in the second phase. Due to very few contradictions being reported across  
conditions, this consistency category will not be considered further in the analyses. A subset  
of 40 interviews (25%) were coded by a second researcher, who was blind to the  
experimental conditions. The inter-rater reliability between the coders was high for details in  
phase one of the interviews (intra-class correlation coefficient [ICC]=.83) and details in phase  
two of the interviews (ICC=.76). Once again, these details were further classified for  
consistency, with satisfactory reliability being found between the two coders for repetitions  
(ICC = .73), reminiscences (ICC = .59) and omissions (ICC = .76).  
Results  
Manipulation checks  
Assignment to condition. A one-way MANOVA was conducted with condition  allocation 
method for Liars (free choice vs forced choice) as the independent variable and  total unique 
detail, detail provided at phase one, detail provided at phase two, omissions,  reminiscences 
and repetitions as dependent variables to examine the effect of free choice or  having been 
assigned a condition on liars’ performance. The multivariate effect was not  significant, F(5, 
67) = 1.92, Wilks’ Λ = .88, p = .10, f = .38. A series of manipulation checks  were also 
conducted to examine whether the participants who chose to be a liar (n = 43) were  
significantly different to those who were assigned to the liar condition (n = 30) in motivation,  
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confidence, age, gender or number of details provided. An independent measures t-test found  
that there was no significant difference between motivation levels of those who chose to lie  
compared to those who were assigned to the liar condition, t(71) = .310, p = .76, d = .07.  
Furthermore, there was no significant difference in the confidence levels, t(71) = .37, p = .72,  
d = .09, the age of free choice vs forced choice liars, t(56.54) = 1.78, p = .08, d = .39, the  
amount of detail provided in the first phase of the interview, t(71) = 1.94, p = .15, d = .33, or  
the second phase of the interview, t(67.01) = 1.96, p = .054, d = .44. A chi-squared test using  
Fisher’s exact test found that there were no significant differences in the gender divide of  
those who chose to be a liar compared to those who were assigned to the liar condition, p =  
.42. The data for participants who chose to be liars and those who were assigned as liars were  
therefore collated in the subsequent analyses. An independent measures t-test found no  
significant difference in the age of those who chose to be truth tellers compared to liars,  
t(156) = .66, p = .51, d = .11, and a chi-squared test using Fisher’s exact test found no  
significant difference in the gender representation within each experimental cell, p = .70.  
Motivation. A 2 (Veracity: truth teller vs liar) × 2 (Order of Recall: chronological  
order recall vs reverse order recall) × 2 (Interviewer: same second interviewer vs different  
second interviewer) ANOVA revealed no significant main or interaction effects on self 
reported motivation scores, all F’s < 3.08, all p’s > .08. The grand means reflected high  
levels of motivation (M = 5.87, SD = .94, 95% CI [5.72, 6.02]), with 74.5% of the sample  
reporting themselves as ‘very’ (6) or ‘completely’ (7) motivated.  
Confidence in performance. A 2 (Veracity: truth teller vs liar) × 2 (Order of Recall:  
chronological order recall vs reverse order recall) × 2 (Interviewer: same second interviewer  
vs different second interviewer) ANOVA revealed that truth tellers reported higher 
confidence levels than liars (see Table 1). No other significant main or interaction effects  
were found for confidence in performance, all F’s < 2.38, all p’s > .13. 
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Memory for stimulus. A 2 (Veracity: truth teller vs liar) × 2 (Order of Recall:   
chronological order recall vs reverse order recall) × 2 (Interviewer: same second interviewer  
vs different second interviewer) ANOVA revealed that truth tellers reported greater memory  
strength than liars (for truth tellers: self-reported memory strength for the video; for liars:  
self-reported memory strength for the synopsis of the documentary, see Table 1). There were  
no other significant main or interaction effects for memory strength for the stimulus, all F’s <  
1.45, all p’s > .23  
Table 1.  
The difference in performance of truth tellers and liars.  
Truth tellers Liars  
M SD 95% CI M SD 95% CI F p f90%  CI f  
Details reported   
in Phase 2101.28* 62.19[80.30,   
122.36]80.54* 46.17[63.45,   
97.63]5.42 .02* .19[.05,   
.32]  
Total Unique   
Details185.53* 88.35[155.58,   
215.48]156.92* 61.91[154.36,   
159.48]4.91 .03* .17[.04,   
.31]  
Omissions 84.59 59.36[72.23,   
96.82]76.66 50.56[65.62,   
88.68].07 .79 .00[.00,   
.14]  
Repetitions 54.93 37.69[47.22,   
63.61]50.14 32.83[43.02,   
57.26].05 .82 .00[.00,   
.12]  
Reminiscences 46.01* 33.67[39.88,   
52.83]30.12* 28.07[24.44,   
37.75]8.40 .004* .25[.10,   
.37]  
Confidence 5.75 .96[5.43,   
6.08]3.51 1.43[2.98,   
4.04]138.65 .001* .95[.79,   
1.11]  
Memory 5.95 .65[5.72,   
6.18]5.52 1.16[5.09,   
5.95]8.93 .004* 1.00[.11,   
.38]  
Notes: Statistically significant differences are highlighted with an asterix. 
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Reported strategies. Overall, 38.4% of the sample reported using a strategy. Truth  
tellers were less likely to use a strategy, with 23% reporting using a strategy, compared to  
56.9% of liars, a difference in proportions of .34, p < .001. Thematic examination of the  
reported strategies found the most common technique to relate to remembering/visualising  
the documentary (for truth tellers) or the summary of the documentary (for liars) in a lot of  
detail (reported by 54.1% of those who used a strategy), followed by considerations of  
nonverbal behaviour (reported by 31.14% of those who used a strategy). Other reported  
strategies included reporting truthful details (11.48% of those who used a strategy), and not  
overthinking (3.28% of those who used a strategy).  
Veracity and reporting  
A series of analyses were run to examine the difference in performance of truth tellers  
and liars on a number of factors (see Table 1). An independent measures t-test was conducted  
to compare the amount of detail provided in the first phase of the interview between truth  
tellers and liars. There was no significant difference in the amount of detail provided by  
veracity condition, t(158) = 1.24, p = .22, d = .20, and consequently Hypothesis 1a, that truth  
tellers would provide more details then liars in the first phase of their interviews, was not  
supported.  
A 2 (Veracity: truth teller vs liar) × 2 (Order of Recall: chronological order recall vs  
reverse order recall) × 2 (Interviewer: same second interviewer vs different second  
interviewer) ANOVA revealed that truth tellers included more details in the second phase of  
their interviews than liars (see Table 1).  
The number of unique details provided across both interview phases was calculated  by 
combining the number of details reported in Phase 1 with the number of reminiscent  details 
reported in Phase 2. No hypotheses were formed regarding reporting of unique detail,  
however exploratory analyses were run. A 2 (Veracity: truth teller vs liar) × 2 (Order of  
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Recall: chronological order recall vs reverse order recall) × 2 (Interviewer: same second  
interviewer vs different second interviewer) ANOVA revealed that truth tellers reported more  
unique details in total than liars (see Table 1). No further effects were found, all F’s < 2.84,  
all p’s > .09.  
Whilst there were no significant differences in the number of omissions or repetitions  
that truth tellers and liars provided, a 2 (Veracity: truth teller vs liar) × 2 (Order of Recall:  
chronological order recall vs reverse order recall) × 2 (Interviewer: same second interviewer  
vs different second interviewer) ANCOVA with the amount of detail provided in Phase 1 of  
the interview as a co-variate revealed that truth tellers included more reminiscence than liars  
(see Table 1). This supports Hypothesis 1b that truth tellers, more so than liars, would  
provide reminiscences (additional detail) in the second phase of their interviews.  
Examinations of interactions and main effects for Order of Recall and Interviewer are  
presented below.  
Details analyses  
We conducted a 2 (Veracity) × 2 (Order of Recall:) × 2 (Interviewer) × 2 (Interview  Phase) 
mixed ANOVA with Interview Phase (i.e. detail reported in Phase 1 vs detail reported  in 
Phase 2) as a within subject factor. Findings indicated a significant difference between the  
amount of detail reported in Phase 1 (M = 133.83, SD = 65.52) and the amount of detail  
reported in Phase 2 (M = 91.82, SD = 56.26), F(1, 152) = 74.38, p < .001, f =.70. There was  
also an interaction effect of Order of Recall and Interview Phase, F(1, 152) = 18.26, p < .001,  
f = .35. To explore this interaction further, we broke it down to examine the effect on Phase 1  
and Phase 2 of the interviews independently. Statistical significance of a simple main effect  
was accepted at a Bonferroni-adjusted alpha level of .025, in order to not capitalise on  
probabilities (Cramer et al., 2016). There was a statistically significant main effect of Order  
of Recall for detail reported in Phase 2, F(1, 158) = 5.82, p = .02, f = .15, but not in Phase 1,  
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F(1, 158) = 3.74, p = .06, f = .19. Mean detail reported in Phase 2 was higher for recall in  
chronological order than recall in reverse order, with a mean difference of 21.15, 95% CI  
[3.84, 38.45], p = .02. There was also a three way interaction identified between Interview  
Phase, Veracity and Interviewer, F(1, 152) = 4.44, p = .04, f = .17. To explore this interaction  
further, we examine Phase 1 and Phase 2 separately. Statistical significance of a simple two 
way interaction was accepted at a Bonferroni-adjusted alpha level of .025. There were no  
statistically significant simple two-way interactions of Interviewer and Veracity for detail  
reported in Phase 1, F(1, 156) = 3.86, p = .051, f = .16, or for detail reported in Phase 2, F(1,  
156) = .01, p = .94, f = .00.  
We examined the amount of detail provided in Phase 2 of the interview using a 2  
(Veracity: truth teller vs liar) × 2 (Order of Recall: chronological order recall vs reverse order  
recall) × 2 (Interviewer: same second interviewer vs different second interviewer) ANOVA  
and found a further main effect for Order of Recall, F(1, 158) = 6.01, p = .02, f = .20. Those  
who reported their second statement in chronological order included more details overall (M 
= 102.26, SD = 55.52, 95% CI [82.75, 121.77]) than those who reported it in reverse order (M 
= 81.11, SD = 55.31, 95% CI [61.43, 100.79]). No further main or interaction effects were  
found, all F’s < 1.58, all p’s > .21.  
Consistency analyses  
Consistency is related to the volume of information that is reported in the initial phase  
of an interview. For example, if more details are reported in phase one of the interview then  
there are subsequently more opportunities for repetitions or omissions and fewer  
opportunities for reminiscences in the second phase of the interview. To control for this, we  
analysed the effect of Veracity, Order of Recall and Interviewer upon repetitions, omissions  
and reminiscences with the amount of detail provided in phase one of the interview as a  
covariate. Contradictions did not occur frequently enough for inclusion in the analyses. 
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Omissions. A 2 (Veracity: truth teller vs liar) × 2 (Order of Recall: chronological  
order recall vs reverse order recall) × 2 (Interviewer: same second interviewer vs different  
second interviewer) ANCOVA with the amount of detail provided in Phase 1 of the interview  
as a co-variate revealed a main effect of Order of Recall on the number of omissions, F(1,  
151) = 24.02, p < .001, f = .40. Those who reported in reverse order exhibited more  
omissions (M= 99.19, SD=55.33, 95% CI [87.79, 112.81]) than those who reported in  
chronological order (M = 63.20, SD = 49.87, 95% CI [53.11, 73.98]). No other main effects  
were found, all F’s < 2.74, all p’s > .10, and consequently Hypothesis 2a, that liars would  
prioritise consistency and therefore have fewer omissions than truth tellers, was not  
supported.  
Repetitions. A 2 (Veracity: truth teller vs liar) × 2 (Order of Recall: chronological  
order recall vs reverse order recall) × 2 (Interviewer: same second interviewer vs different  
second interviewer) ANCOVA with the amount of detail provided in Phase 1 of the interview  
as a co-variate revealed a main effect for Order of Recall on the number of repetitions, F(1,  
151) = 23.44, p < .001, f = .40. Individuals who reported in chronological order included  
more repetitions (M = 60.60, SD = 33.68, 95% CI [53.28, 68.14]) than those who reported in  
reverse order (M = 44.68, SD = 35.76, 95% CI [37.26, 52.75]). No further effects were found,  
all F’s < 2.57, all p’s > .11, and consequently Hypothesis 2b, that liars would prioritise  
consistency and include more repetitions than truth tellers was not supported.  
The Veracity × Interviewer interaction was not significant, F(1,151) = 2.57, p = .11, f 
= .00, and therefore no support was found for Hypothesis 3a that truth tellers would include  
more repetitions and fewer omissions when interviewed by a different interviewer in phase  
two compared to the same interviewer, or Hypothesis 3b that liars would include more  
repetitions and fewer omissions when interviewed by the same interviewer compared to a  
different interviewer. 
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Reminiscent details. A 2 (Veracity: truth teller vs liar) × 2 (Order of Recall:  chronological 
order recall vs reverse order recall) × 2 (Interviewer: same second interviewer  vs different 
second interviewer) ANCOVA with the amount of detail provided in Phase 1 of   
the interview as a co-variate revealed a main effect of Interviewer on number of  
reminiscences, F(1, 151) = 4.56, p = .03, f = .17, which revealed that those interviewed by the  
same interviewer included more reminiscences (M = 45.15, SD = 38.20, 95% CI [36.89,  
54.03]) than those interviewed by a different second interviewer (M = 32.53, SD = 23.48,  
95% CI [27.87, 37.58]). No further effects were found, all F’s < 2.36, all p’s > .13.  
Hypothesis 4 predicted that reverse order recall would elicit more reminiscences than  
chronological order recall in truth tellers. To specifically test this hypothesis we compared  
the number of reminiscences provided in reverse order and chronological recalls for truth  
tellers only using a between subjects t-test. No significant difference was found, t(85) = .65, 
p = .52, d = .14 with truth tellers including an average of 43.68 (SD = 36.04) reminiscent  
details in reverse order interviews, and an average of 48.40 (SD = 31.30) reminiscent details  
in chronological order.  
Hypothesis 5 predicted that liars would make more omissions during reverse order  
recall than during chronological order recall. We examined this using a between subjects t 
test and found that liars made significantly more omissions during reverse order recall (M =  
96.97, SD = 55.42, 95% CI [67.76, 126.18]) than during chronological order recall (M =  
57.95, SD = 37.45, 95% CI [38.74, 77.16]), t(71) = 3.55, p = .001, d = .84.  
Discussion  
Replicating previous findings in deception research, truth tellers provided more  details than 
liars in the second phase of their interviews, as well as over both phases of the  interview 
combined (Amado et al., 2015; Vrij, 2008). However, fewer details were reported  
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by both truth tellers and liars in the second phase of the interview when compared to the first  
phase, and there were no differences in the number of details provided by truth tellers or liars  
in the initial phase of the interviews. Our participants did not know they were going to be re  
interviewed, and initially liars and truth tellers provided an equivalent amount of detail.  
When prompted to discuss the matter further, truth tellers were more likely than liars to  
expand their testimony to include new information, despite both groups providing less detail  
than in the previous phase of the interview. This expansion on testimony is often found in the  
‘encouraging interviewees to say more’ deception literature (Vrij et al., 2017). It is interesting  
to note the decrease in detail provided during the second phase of the interview by both truth  
tellers and liars, despite the increase in reminiscent details for truth tellers compared to liars,  
and no veracity-based differences for omissions or repetitions. We based our design on that  
of Leins et al. (2011) and Leins et al. (2012), who also examined within-statement  
consistency using two accounts taken from the same interviewing session. However, we  
instigated a shorter break between phases of the interview, and this could be considered a  
limitation of the design, resulting in a lack of motivation for participants to repeat the story in  
full again.  
In addition, truth tellers included more reminiscent details during the second phase of  their 
interviews than liars, but there were no significant differences between truth tellers and  liars 
for the number of repetitions or omissions (see also Granhag et al., 2003). This inclusion  of 
reminiscent details suggests that truth tellers, more than liars, prioritised providing new  
information in Phase 2 of their interviews, instead of simply maintaining their original  
narrative. Reminiscences are commonly observed in memory research (Gilbert & Fisher,  
2006) and the current findings provide further support for the failure of liars to account for  
natural side effects of rudimentary memory systems (Harvey, Vrij, Leal, Hope, & Mann,  
2017). If we define statement consistency as the presence of repetitions and the absence of  
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omissions and reminiscences, the findings suggest that liars were more consistent than truth  
tellers due to the relative absence of reminiscences in liars’ accounts. This lack of consistency  
for truth tellers is generally found across the literature (see Vredeveldt et al., 2014 for an  
overview), although remains at odds with the popular belief that deception involves a lack of  
consistency.  
In the current experiment, we introduced two manipulations during the interview  
process and examined their effects on liars’ and truth tellers’ statements: (i) introducing a  
prompt for reverse order recall, similar to Vrij et al. (2012) and (ii) switching the interviewer,  
similar to Shaw et al. (2014). We were particularly interested in whether these manipulations  
would induce inconsistencies in liars. We found little evidence to support this notion. This  
may have been due to limitations with the liars’ task, whereby liars were required to read a  
review-style synopsis of a Sir David Attenborough documentary, and to pretend that they had  
watched it. Due to the immense popularity of Sir David Attenborough’s work in the United  
Kingdom (Smith, 2018), it is possible that liars were familiar with the style of Sir David  
Attenborough’s work, and therefore able to perform at an overall similar level to the truth  
tellers.  
When interviewed for the second phase of the interview, all individuals reporting in  
chronological order included more details and more repetitions than those reporting in  
reverse order. The number of omissions also increased for all individuals asked to recall in  
reverse order rather than chronological order, but the type of recall had no discernible effect  
on the number of reminiscences. The increase in omissions is most likely due to the increased  
cognitive load that results from reporting events in reverse order. The reverse order technique  
was designed as a memory enhancing task as part of the Cognitive Interview (Fisher &  
Geiselman, 1992) designed to break script reliance and help trigger items without script  
rehearsal. Theoretically, this could have led to a greater number of reminiscences in truthful  
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interviews, as honest interviewees were required to examine their memory utilising different  
retrieval processes to trigger further recollections (Fisher et al., 2009), though in this study  
we found no effect of Order of Recall on reminiscences. There was a significant effect of  
Order of Recall for liars, who exhibited significantly more omissions when reporting in  
reverse order. However, there was no significant difference in the number of omissions  
between truth tellers and liars when providing either chronological order or reverse order  
recalls, which suggests both groups found the tasks equally difficult. We speculate that this  
may be due to the brevity of the break between interview phases, whereby the information  
that participants had provided in Phase 1 of the interview was still fresh in their mind.  
The number of reminiscent details reported increased for individuals interviewed by  
the same second interviewer, compared to those who were interviewed by a different  
interviewer in the second phase of their interview. One possible explanation for this finding is  
that the interviewees thought that the same interviewer had returned because s/he was not  
satisfied with the amount of information s/he had initially gathered. This suggestion is  
speculative though, as there could be a variety of explanations for this increase in  
reminiscence, such as the context of talking to the same person again, or the familiarity of  
being interviewed by the same person. However, there were no significant differences in the  
number of repetitions provided, or omissions made by veracity condition as a result of  
changing interviewer, which may be due to the relatively short nature of the interviews.  
Establishing the effect of changing interviewers on statement consistency is important,  
considering how many people interview individuals being processed through the criminal  
justice system (e.g. investigators, lawyers, psychologists), and who operate with the belief  
that consistency is indicative of honesty (Bogaard & Meijer, 2017). A better examination of  
the effect of this would be to compare changing or maintaining interviewers when  
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interviewees are providing longer statements for personally experienced episodic events, as  
would likely be found in the criminal justice system.  
The design of this study was somewhat similar to that of Shaw et al. (2014), although  
we were unable to replicate the effects they found when switching interviewer. Shaw et al.  
(2014) found that when the interviewers were changed partway through the interviews, truth  
tellers provided more detail in the second phase of the interviews than when presented with  
the same interviewer, and that their answers across both phases of the interviews included  
more repetitions than the answers provided by liars. In the current study, however, we only  
noted a difference in the number of reminiscences provided by interviewees due to changing  
interviewer. There are a number of methodological differences between the studies that might  
account for this discrepancy. First, Shaw et al. (2014) asked participants to fabricate  
information about an experience rather than providing them with information on which to  
base their alibi. Providing our participants with this alibi information prevented interviewees  
from crafting their own deception, which may be where the source of variance in  
performance arises. In addition, Shaw et al. (2014) used a coding system whereby participant  
statements were scored with respect to 18 key points and then subjectively rated for 
consistency. In comparison, our statements were objectively coded for every detail that the  
participant mentioned, which provided more opportunities for consistencies or  
inconsistencies to arise.  
Most participants were provided with the opportunity to select their veracity  condition, 
however there was a small subsection who were recruited in the knowledge they  would be 
asked to lie. We propose that the latter group of participants were also afforded the  option of 
participating as a liar, but this choice was presented at an earlier stage when they  
volunteered to participate knowing they would be required to lie. Research has shown there  
to be no difference in performance between those exhibiting forced and voluntary dishonesty  
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(Geven, Selle, Ben-Shakhar, Kindt, & Verschuere, 2018; Nahari, Breska, Elber, Klein Selle,  
& Ben-Shakhar, 2017). Whilst the mixed nature of having free choice liars and forced liars  
may be considered a limitation, as there were no differences in the demographics, motivation  
or performance of participants in the current study, it was reasonable to combine these two  
groups for analysis. Furthermore, providing participants with the choice to be a liar or truth  
teller could be considered a limitation, as it may have introduced a systematic bias whereby  
the individuals who volunteered as liars were more practiced, and therefore possibly more  
skilled at deception. However, we argue that this choice is reflective of real life, where  
individuals make a decision as to whether they wish to lie about something. Therefore, those  
who may be uncomfortable with lying would be less likely to lie. When examining who  
chose to be a liar compared to those who chose to be a truth teller, we found no differences in  
background characteristics such as gender (consistent with DePaulo et al., [1996]) or age, nor  
did we find any difference in motivation levels across experimental cells, suggesting that  
those who chose to tell the truth, lie or were asked to lie were all equally motivated to  
succeed. We encourage further research into the impact of choice upon deceptive behaviour,  
and suggest future studies could consider examining the performance of both free choice and  
forced truth tellers and liars.  
Considering the number of individuals who work within the criminal justice system,  and 
operate under the belief that consistency is indicative of honesty (Bogaard & Meijer,  2017; 
Strömwall & Granhag, 2003), examining the statement consistency for truthful and  
deceptive suspects is important to help practitioners make informed veracity judgements. In  
the current study, we investigated the influence of recall order and a change in interviewer on  
the within-statement consistency of both truth tellers and liars. This has important  
implications for those involved in the criminal justice system, where suspects may be  
interviewed multiple times by different people, and be subject to a variety of interviewing  
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techniques throughout their interviews. No effects were found for changing the interviewer  
and changing the recall order on repetitions and omissions. It seems therefore that the  
combination of these interviewing techniques is not necessarily beneficial for enhanced  
deception detection.  
Despite the popular belief that inconsistency is a cue to deception, we also found little  
support for the notion that consistency (or lack of consistency) offers diagnostic cues to  
deception. If anything, due to the natural occurrence of reminiscences in our truth tellers’  
statements, as is commonly found in memory research (Gilbert & Fisher, 2006), our findings  
suggest that liars are more consistent than truth tellers, and that the consistency heuristic is an  
inconsistent and impractical cue to deception.  
CH is responsible for the design, material development, data collection, analysis and  
manuscript preparation of Experiment 1. AV, LA, and LH provided guidance and feedback  
on experimental design and comments on the manuscript draft.  
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Chapter III  
An examination of the Self-Administered Interview (SAI) as a verbal veracity  
assessment tool.  
Abstract  
The self-administered interview (SAI) is a written eyewitness recall tool that elicits more  
information from cooperative witnesses than written free recall (WFR) formats. To date, SAI  
research has examined the accounts of cooperative people providing honest reports. In the  
current experiment, truthful and fabricating participants (N = 128) either completed a WFR  
or a SAI after witnessing a crime (initial account). After a 1-week delay, participants were  
interviewed verbally (subsequent interview). Truth tellers reported significantly more detail  
than liars in both the initial account and subsequent interview, and participants who  
completed the SAI reported more detail than those completing the WFR. Truth tellers  
repeated and omitted more information in the subsequent interview than liars; however, there  
was no significant difference in the number of reminiscent details reported. Although the SAI  
is effective in eliciting information as an initial eyewitness reporting tool, no benefits for the  
detection of deception were demonstrated. 
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Introduction  
Eyewitness evidence is often crucial for police investigations. In the case of serious  
events, the number of eyewitnesses can outstrip the level of police resources available at the  
scene. Ideally, eyewitness testimony should be gathered as soon as possible after an event to  
reduce memory decay and exposure to post‐event misinformation, which may compromise  
the quality and quantity of later recall (Hope, Gabbert, & Fisher, 2011). Although  
investigators try to prioritise managing witnesses at the scene, there are often factors, such as  
a large volume of witnesses to deal with, that restrict comprehensive eyewitness interviews  
from taking place for days, or even weeks, after the event (Hope, Gabbert, Fisher, &  
Jamieson, 2014). Post‐event misinformation in high‐stress environments can spread  
especially quickly through modern social networks such as Twitter (Huang, Starbird, Orand,  
Stanek, & Pedersen, 2015), a site heavily used during high‐profile incidents (Saleem, Xu, &  
Ruths, 2014), which increases the need for authorities to gather comprehensive witness  
reports as soon as possible.  
The majority of research into eyewitness testimony has been conducted in the context  that, 
on the whole, witnesses try to provide genuine reports, and that any inaccuracies that  may 
arise in their statements are the result of honest mistakes. Yet, in some circumstances,  hostile 
or uncooperative individuals may deliberately provide misleading reports to derail  
investigations. Law enforcement professionals often try to discern the accuracy of witness'  
statements to help direct the investigation (Desmarais & Yarmey, 2004; Masip & Herrero,  
2015). While many witnesses are cooperative and can be trusted to provide credible and  
reliable accounts, in certain contexts or circumstances, witnesses who are hostile to the aims  
of the police or investigation may intentionally mislead investigators. They may do this for a  
variety of reasons including attempts to protect the perpetrator, fear of retribution from the  
perpetrator, or even distrust of the authorities (Parliament & Yarmey, 2002; Yarmey, 2004). 
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It has been shown across a variety of modalities that truth tellers often report more  
information than liars (Amado, Arce, Fariña, & Vilarino, 2016; DePaulo et al., 2003). Liars  
may lack the creativity or imagination to fabricate details to an equivalent level to that  
provided by truth tellers (Vrij, Hope, & Fisher, 2014), or may intentionally minimise the  
amount of detail reported out of fear that additional detail may provide leads for investigators  
(Vrij, Granhag, Mann & Leal, 2011). Liars may also decide to report as little information as  
possible, to reduce the opportunity to contradict themselves in subsequent interviews  
(Vredeveldt, van Koppen & Granhag, 2014). Thus, liars' accounts are often shorter and less  
detailed than those typically provided by truth tellers.  
In repeated interviews, details can be compared and classified into four categories to  
discern consistency; repetition, reminiscences (sometimes referred to as commissions in  
deception research), omissions and contradictions (Fisher, Vrij, & Leins, 2013). The  
occurrence of repetitions (information that is reported during both interviews) increases  
consistency, and the occurrence of reminiscences (information that is reported in a  
subsequent interview, but not reported in the primary interview), omissions (information that  
is provided during an initial interview, but not reported in a subsequent interview) and  
contradictions (information provided in the subsequent interview that directly opposes what  
was reported in the primary interview) decrease consistency.  
Perceptions of consistency can influence credibility judgements (Reinhard & Sporer,  2008), 
with 8 out of 10 police officers reporting that they believe consecutive statements  given by 
the same individual will be more consistent if the individual is telling the truth as  opposed to 
telling a lie (Strömwall & Granhag, 2003). In fact, when more than one statement  is 
available, judges rely on the perceptions of consistency as a cue to veracity more than any  
other cue (Strömwall, Granhag & Jonsson, 2003), despite research frequently finding there is  
very little difference between truth teller and liar consistency (Granhag & Strömwall, 2002;  
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Granhag, Strömwall, & Jonsson, 2003; Granhag, Mac Giolla, Sooniste, Strömwall, & Liu‐ 
Jonsson, 2016). For instance, Granhag and Strömwall (2002) found that over three  
interrogations truth tellers repeated more details and omitted more information that liars did,  
and that there was no difference in the amount of reminiscent detail reported by truth tellers  
and liars. As such, truth tellers' and liars' statements were about equally consistent over time,  
which was corroborated by the consistency ratings that the truth tellers' and liars' provided  
about their own statements. Conversely, Granhag et al. (2003) found that there was no  
difference between the number of repetitions or omissions given by truth tellers and liars over  
two interrogations, and that truth tellers provided more reminiscent detail in the second  
interrogation than liars did. Furthermore, when the statements were subjectively rated for  
consistency, liars' and truth tellers' statements were perceived equally consistent. Granhag et  
al. (2016) also found that the consistency of truth tellers and liars was similar when  
examining repetitions, reminiscences and omissions. Yet when Masip et al. (2018) asked  
uninformed laypeople to make veracity judgements on a series of written statements, they  
found that 90% of the laypeople reported using consistency/inconsistency to assist in making  
their judgement. This is incongruous with research examining truth tellers' and liars'  
consistency, as well as memory research, which suggests that some types of inconsistencies,  
such as omissions and reminiscence, are commonly found in memory accounts (Fisher,  
Brewer & Mitchell, 2009; Gilbert & Fisher, 2006; Strange, Dysart, & Loftus, 2014).  
When individuals were interviewed about witnessing a videotaped mock crime, 98%  of 
truthful participants included reminiscence in their second recall (Gilbert & Fisher, 2006).  
Liars, however, may be less likely to include new details in subsequent statements, in order to  
maintain a greater level of consistency, or due to an unfamiliarity with natural memory  
phenomena (Harvey, Vrij, Hope, Leal, & Mann, 2017). The repeat versus reconstruct  
hypothesis (Granhag & Strömwall, 1999) suggests that liars have the aim of being consistent  
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across interviews to present themselves as being honest, and therefore avoid introducing  
reminiscent detail. However, truth tellers are less concerned with appearing consistent, and  
therefore reconstruct the event from memory, thereby introducing reminiscent detail. The 
Self-Administered Interview ©   
The Self-Administered Interview (SAI©; Gabbert, Hope & Fisher, 2009) was initially  
developed as a tool to enable investigators to gather an extensive initial report from  
cooperative eyewitnesses, either at the scene of an event, or shortly after, without placing any  
additional strain on available resources. The SAI is a reporting tool that draws on memory  
theory and empirical research to promote a comprehensive free recall, from witnesses, in  
their own words. The SAI has been shown to facilitate the reporting of more correct details,  
compared to a written Free Recall (WFR) statement collection method (Gabbert et al., 2009),  
and greater consistency (e.g., participants completing the SAI included proportionally more  
repetitions and fewer reminiscences during a second recall after a 1‐week delay than those  
completing a WFR; Hope et al., 2014), which is beneficial in legal settings where consistency  
is valued (Fisher et al., 2009). It has been found that completing a SAI shortly after  
witnessing an event leads witnesses to recall more correct information in a delayed recall test,  
to report less misleading post‐event information, and to be more resistant to misleading  
questions (Gabbert, Hope, Fisher, & Jamieson, 2012). Research suggests that the SAI should  
be administered as soon as possible, as recall accuracy decreases and post‐event  
misinformation susceptibility increases when the SAI is administered more than 24 hr after an  
event (Paterson, Eijkemans, & Kemp, 2015).  
Due to the greater amount of detail prompted with the SAI (Gabbert et al., 2009), we  
predicted that in the initial account all participants completing the SAI would include  
significantly more details than those completing a WFR (Hypothesis 1), and that statements  
provided by truth tellers completing the SAI would have significantly higher accuracy rates  
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than statements provided by truth tellers completing the WFR (Hypothesis 2). With research  
indicating that truth tellers report more details than liars (Amado et al., 2016; DePaulo et al.,  
2003), it was predicted that truth tellers would include significantly more repetitions in their  
subsequent interview than liars, particularly if they initially completed the SAI, as they would   
have initially reported more details which they could repeat (Hypothesis 3). It was also  
predicted that as reminiscences are commonly found in repeated honest recalls (Fisher et al.,  
2009; Gilbert & Fisher, 2018; Strange et al., 2014), truth tellers will include significantly  
more reminiscences in their subsequent interview than liars, who may avoid including new  
information, as they wish to be perceived as consistent (Granhag & Strömwall, 1999),  
particularly if they initially completed the SAI (Hypothesis 4). Liars may feel that by  
completing the SAI, they have already provided an adequately detailed account and be  
reluctant to expand their statement further, in an effort to keep their story simple (Granhag &  
Strömwall, 2002; Hartwig, Granhag & Strömwall, 2007).  
Method  
Participants  
A total of 128 participants (45 male, 83 female, with ages ranging from 18 to  
74 years, M = 26.92 years, SD = 9.84 years) were recruited from a British university using  
opportunity sampling. Participants received a £10 honorarium on completion of the research  
session. A total of 46 participants were undergraduate students, with the remaining 82 being  
local community members.  
Design  
This study used a 2 (Veracity: truth teller vs. liar) × 2 (Initial account type: SAI vs.  WFR) 
× 2 (Time of interview: initial account vs. subsequent interview) mixed design.  Veracity and 
Initial account type were between‐subjects measures, and time of interview was  
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a within‐subjects measure as all participants provided both an initial account and subsequent  
interview. Participants were randomly allocated to either the truth teller or liar condition  
before being asked to watch the stimulus video, and were then randomly allocated to either  
the SAI or WFR condition to give their initial account of what they had witnessed. Following  
a delay of 1 week, all participants returned to be interviewed. This study was preregistered on  
the Open Science Framework (OSF), and all of the materials and datasets can be found at  
osf.io/fjuzm/. The preregistration can be found at osf.io/y4hfw.  
Materials  
Stimulus materials. A film was shot in first‐person perspective and featured the view  
of an individual who walks down a footpath in a park, checks a wristwatch for the time,  
accidentally bumps into another person, receives a phone call, and then witnesses a car  
hitting a pedestrian in a car park. The viewer then sees the driver exit the car, stab the  
pedestrian who had been hit by the car, and then shout, wave a knife, and chase other  
witnesses. The perpetrator comes toward the viewer and speaks directly to them before  
continuing past. A man dressed in military uniform then approaches the viewer and informs  
the viewer that this was a terrorist attack, and that they need to complete a written report  
about what they had witnessed. The event lasted 1 minute 55 seconds.  
Initial accounts. Participants in the SAI condition were provided with a copy of the  SAI to 
complete. The SAI contains several sections (as described in Gabbert et al., 2009), and  asks 
for descriptions of; what happened, the scene, people present at the scene, the  perpetrator, 
any vehicles involved, how well participants could see the incident, and any  other 
information about the event. The first section promotes the importance of following the  
instructions, highlighting the requirement to complete the sections in sequential order. In the  
second section, witnesses are requested to complete a free recall, drawing in the Context  
Reinstatement and Report Everything components of the Cognitive Interview. The next  
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section focuses on details regarding the perpetrators while in the following section witnesses  
are instructed to provide a sketch the scene. In the final section, witnesses are asked to report  
aspects they may have not previously considered, such as viewing conditions at the scene  
(e.g., distance from incident, weather, etc.). Participants completed the SAI in an average of  
25 minutes 18 seconds (SD = 9 minutes 24 seconds).  
Participants in the WFR condition were provided with instructions for completing the  
WFR and were given a blank sheet of paper for their statement. Participants were instructed  
that they should report all of the details about the incident and the people involved that they  
could remember, and to avoid making guesses about things they were unable to remember.  
They were advised that they could report the event in whatever manner they preferred (e.g.,  
paragraphs, bullet points, etc.) and that the information that they provided should be as  
detailed and accurate as possible. Participants completed the WFR in an average of  
13 minutes 24 seconds (SD = 7 minutes 44 seconds).  
Post-report questionnaires. A 17‐item post‐report questionnaire was administered  
after participants had provided their initial account to gather information about their  
motivation, comprehension of the task, perceived interview performance and memory of the  
video (rated on 10‐point scales). Five questions concerned comprehension of the task (e.g., “I  
found the instructions easy to understand”), five questions concerned perceived interview  
performance (e.g., “I was very detailed in my account”), and five questions concerned  
memory for the video (e.g., “My memory of the video is very clear”). The questionnaire also  
included an open‐ended question about strategies used by truth tellers and liars. Procedure  
Participants were randomly allocated to act as a truth teller or a liar in the study, and  
briefed accordingly. Truth tellers were informed that they were going to watch a video of a  
short fictional attack being conducted by enemy forces, and that they were to treat it as an  
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event that they were witnessing live. They were told to be completely truthful in their written  
report to help their team catch the perpetrator. Liars were also informed that they were going  
to watch a video of a short fictional attack, and to treat it as an event that they were  
witnessing live. However, they were told that they were an undercover colleague of the  
perpetrator, and that their role was to protect this colleague by misleading the enemy forces  
who would investigate the incident. Therefore, they were informed that they should lie about  
the perpetrator when writing their report, so both they (the participant) and their colleague  
(the perpetrator) could evade detection by the enemy forces.  
Participants were then invited to put on the virtual reality headset and a set of  headphones to 
watch the video. Virtual reality presentation was used to increase immersion  in the event 
(Bowman & McMahan, 2007). After watching the stimulus film, all participants   
removed the headset and headphones, and were asked to complete either the SAI or WFR  
initial account regarding what they had witnessed. Regardless of interview condition, all  
participants were instructed to complete their account in their own time, using their own  
words, whilst bearing in mind their objective as either a truth teller or liar. They were shown  
to a quiet room where they completed the report independently. Upon completing their  
report, they were asked to complete the demographic and post‐report questionnaires.  
Descriptive statistics and group comparisons for these questionnaires are provided in  
Appendix 1.  
Participants returned to the laboratory 7 days later for their subsequent interview. On  arrival 
they were asked if they remembered their veracity condition (all participants did), and  were 
reminded of their objective. Truth tellers were informed that the person who was going  to 
interview them was on the same team as they were, and consequently they were instructed  to 
provide a completely honest report about what they saw. Liars were informed that the  person 
who was going to interview them was working for enemy forces, and that they should  
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deceive the interviewer to protect the colleague who conducted the attack. Participants were  
then introduced to the interviewer and informed that the interview would be audio recorded.  
All participants were interviewed individually. The interviewer, who had not read the  
participants' previous accounts, was instructed to elicit as much information as possible using  
a modified Structured Interview Protocol (SIP; Gabbert et al., 2016). The SIP is a flexible  
interview protocol derived from best practice policy (e.g., PEACE). It opens with rapport  
building behaviours (the engage and explain phase of PEACE interviewing) and starts with  
an open‐ended request for interviewees to provide a detailed free narrative. Interviewers are  
instructed to prioritise the use of open questions throughout the interview to maximise  
information gathering. In each interview conducted for the current research, the interviewer  
asked for an open‐ended free recall, and two open‐ended prompt questions regarding the  
critical incident. Interviews took on average 7 minutes 39 seconds (SD = 1 minute 1 second).  
After the interview, participants were asked to complete the same post‐report questionnaire  
that they had completed after their initial account. They were then fully debriefed, provided  
with another opportunity to ask any questions, and paid a £10 honorarium. Coding and 
analysis  
The transcripts were first coded for detail (specified as “person”, “object”, “action”  and 
“location”, following the coding protocol used by Gabbert, Hope & Fisher, 2009). For  
example, “a man got out of the car, he was a skinny man” would contain two person details  
(“man” and “skinny”), one action detail (got out), and one object detail (car). Details were  
only counted the first time they were mentioned in each account. A total detail score for each  
account was computed by adding the number of person, object, action, and location details  
provided. The details found in truth tellers’ statements were further coded for accuracy  
(specified as “correct detail”, “incorrect detail”, and “confabulation”, as used in Vredeveldt,  
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Baddeley & Hitch, 2013). With respect to liars’ statements3, as liars were required to embed  
their lies in an account of the same incident (i.e. acknowledge they were there but  
misrepresent what happened and who was involved), we coded for “truthful” details (i.e.  
details that were accurate), as well as “fabricated” details (i.e. details that were completely  
fabricated and of which there was no evidence in the film, such as mention of additional  
witnesses), and “distorted” details (i.e. amending details in the video, such as altering the  
description of the perpetrators’ clothes, so they were a distorted version of actual details).   
For both truth tellers and liars, the details provided in their subsequent interviews were 
compared to those provided in their initial accounts, and categorised as the four  elements of 
consistency (specified as “repetition”, “omission”, “reminiscent”, and  “contradiction4”, as 
described by Fisher, Vrij & Leins, 2013). A subset of 26 interviews  (20%) were coded by a 
second researcher, who was blind to the experimental conditions.  Any disagreements 
between the two raters were discussed and resolved. The inter-rater  reliability between the 
coders was high for detail in the initial accounts (intra-class  correlation coefficient [ICC] = 
.94) and detail in the subsequent interviews (ICC = .91).  Satisfactory reliability was also 
found across the two coders for repetitions (ICC = .86),  reminiscences (ICC = .73), 
contradictions (ICC = .77) and acceptable for omissions (ICC =  .51). Truth tellers’ accounts 
were also coded for accuracy, and inter-rater reliability was  found to be good for the initial 
accounts (ICC = .91), and the subsequent interviews (ICC =  .86). Liars’ initial accounts 
coded for truthful (ICC = .96), fabricated (ICC = .97) and  distorted details (ICC = .95) were 
also found to have high inter-rater reliability, as were their   
3 This coding scheme is exploratory and was developed after collecting the data to identify the types of details  
liars used to build their narrative. Given it’s exploratory nature, this coding and subsequent analyses were not  
included in the pre-registration.  
4 Contradictory details were relatively infrequent within the subsequent interviews (as has previously been  
found by Granhag and Strömwall, 2000, 2001) and were not suitable for meaningful statistical analysis. When  
contradictions did occur, there was only one contradictory detail in 18.9% of statements, and two contradictory  
details in 11.8% of statements, with the data being skewed towards absence. 
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subsequent interviews (truthful ICC = .88, fabricated ICC = .92, and distorted ICC = .94). For  
each of the analyses, parametric assumptions were checked and met, all p’s > .05.  
Results  
Analyses relating to the hypotheses5  
Initial account. A 2 (Veracity: truth teller vs liar) x 2 (Initial account type: SAI vs  
WFR) ANOVA revealed a main effect for Veracity, F(1, 124) = 12.99, p < .001, f = .30,  
BF(10) = 13.43, with truth tellers reporting more details than liars (Table 2). As was predicted  
in Hypothesis 1, there was also a significant effect of the Initial account type on the number  
of details provided, F(1, 124) = 46.04, p < .001, f = .61, BF(10) = 5.33 x 106, with those  
completing the SAI providing significantly more details than those who completed a WFR  
(see Table 2). No significant interaction effect was found, F(1, 124) = .35, p = .55, BF(01) = 
2.28.  
5 Whilst our preregistration stated the data would be analysed with ANCOVAs, it became clear that, as we had  
manipulated one group to provide more information (i.e. complete the SAI), it did not make sense to control for  
the greater amount of information subsequently. Therefore, we report the results of ANOVAs for repetitions,  
reminiscences, and omissions.  
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Table 2.   
Number of details reported in the initial account and subsequent interview 
(SD) Initial account  
Truth teller Liar Total 
SAI 48.75 (14.14)  
95% CI [43.65, 53.84]  
WFR 35.06 (12.87)  
95% CI [30.41, 39.70]  
Total 41.91 (15.08) * 95% 
CI [38.81, 45.00]  
Subsequent interview  
SAI 50.38 (13.79)  
95% CI [45.82, 54.93]  
WFR 48.84 (14.54)  
95% CI [44.29, 53.40]  
Total 49.61 (14.08) ** 95% 
CI [46.39, 52.82]  
Notes: * p < .001, ** p = 
.001 
42.09 (12.20)  
95% CI [37.69, 46.49] 
25.78 (10.55)  
95% CI [21.98, 29.58] 
33.93 (13.98) *   
95% CI [30.84, 37.03]  
43.88 (12.24)  
95% CI [39.32, 48.43] 
38.97 (11.21)  
95% CI [34.42, 43.52] 
41.42 (11.90) **  
95% CI [38.20, 44.64]  
45.42 (13.52) *   
95% CI [42.33, 48.52] 
30.42 (12.57) *  
95% CI [27.33, 33.52]  
47.13 (13.34)  
95% CI [43.91, 50.34] 
43.91 (13.81)  
95% CI [40.69, 47.13] 
An independent samples t-test found no significant difference in the accuracy of the  
initial accounts given by truth tellers completing the SAI or a WFR, t(62) = 1.46, p = .55,  
BF(01) = 3.37. Therefore, no support was found for Hypothesis 2. Furthermore, there was no  
significant difference in the accuracy of the subsequent interviews given by truth tellers  
completing the SAI compared to truth tellers completing a WFR , t(62) = .65, p = .52, BF(01) 
= 3.28.  
Repetitions. We ran a 2 (Veracity: truth teller vs liar) x 2 (Initial account type: SAI vs  WFR) 
ANOVA, to examine the number of repetitions provided by truth tellers and liars.  There was 
a main effect of Veracity on the number of details that were repeated, F(1, 124) =  10.64, p = 
.001, f = .29 BF(10) = 11.23, with truth tellers providing significantly more   
75  
repetitions (M = 30.27, SD = 10.87, 95% CI [27.61, 32.93] than liars (M = 24.22, SD = 10.81,  
95% CI [21.57, 26.87]. We also found a main effect of Initial account type, F(1, 124) = 9.89,  
p = .002, f = .28, BF(10) = 15.60, with those who initially provided a SAI including more  
repetitions in their second account (M = 30.16, SD = 11.77, 95% CI [27.28, 33.04]) than  
those who used the WFR (M = 24.33, SD = 9.89, 95% CI [21.01, 26.75]). There was no  
significant interaction between Veracity and Initial account, F(1, 124) = .81, p = .37, BF(10) =  
.36, and, consequentially, no support was found for Hypothesis 3.  
Reminiscences. We ran a 2 (Veracity: truth teller vs liar) x 2 (Initial account: SAI vs  
WFR) ANOVA to examine the number of reminiscences provided by truth tellers and liars.  
All participants provided at least one reminiscent detail in their subsequent interview, though  
there were no significant main or interaction effects revealed by this analysis, all F’s < 3.07,  
all p’s > .08, BF(10) > .76. Therefore, no support was found for Hypothesis 4.  Additional 
analyses.   
Details provided in subsequent interview. A 2 (Veracity: truth teller vs liar) x 2  
(Initial account: SAI vs WFR) ANOVA revealed a main effect for Veracity, F(1, 124) =  
12.67, p = .001, f = .32, with truth tellers reporting more details in their subsequent interview 
than liars (Table 2). There were no significant Initial account type main effects or interaction  
effects, all F’s < 1.96, all p’s > .16.   
Comparison of detail across accounts. We conducted a 2 (Veracity: truth teller vs  
liar) x 2 (Initial account: SAI vs WFR) x 2 (Time: initial account vs subsequent interview)  
repeated measures ANOVA, with Time as a within subjects factor, on the amount of detail  
provided in the initial account and subsequent interview. Findings indicated a main effect of  
Time, with significantly more detail reported in the subsequent interview (M = 45.52, SD =  
13.62, 95% CI [43.24, 47.79]) than the initial account (M = 37.92, SD = 15.03, 95% CI  
[35.73, 40.11]), F(1, 124) = 101.75, p < .001, f = .91.  
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There was also an interaction effect of Time and Initial account type, F(1, 124) =  
61.23, p < .001, f = .70, such that there was a significant main effect of Time (initial account  
vs subsequent interview) for those in the WFR condition, F(1, 124) = 160.42, p < .001 , f =  
1.14, but not those in the SAI condition, F(1, 124) = 2.56, p = .11. To further explore the  
effect of Time on those in the WFR condition, we broke the interaction down into the amount  
of detail reported in each account. Statistical significance of a simple main effect was  
accepted at a Bonferroni-adjusted alpha level of .025, in order to not capitalise on  
probabilities (Cramer et al., 2016). For those in the WFR condition, there were significantly  
fewer details reported in the initial account (M = 30.42, SD = 8.84, 95% CI [27.33, 33.52])  
than in the subsequent interview (M = 43.91, SD = 9.20, 95% CI [40.69, 47.13]). There was  
no significant difference between the amount of details reported in the initial account (M =  
45.42, SD = 13.52, 95% CI [42.33, 48.52]) and the subsequent interview (M = 47.13, SD =  
13.34, 95% CI [43.91, 50.34]) for those in the SAI condition. The interaction effect of Time  
and Veracity was not significant, F(1, 124) = .02, p = .89, nor was the interaction of Time,  
Veracity and Initial account, F(1, 124) = .06, p = .80.  
Omissions. To explore the amount of detail that liars and truth tellers omitted from  
their initial accounts, we conducted a 2 (Veracity: truth teller vs liar) x 2 (Initial account: SAI  
vs WFR) ANOVA on the number of omitted details. There was a main effect of Initial 
account, F(1, 123) = 142.77, p < .001, f = 1.06, with those completing the SAI in their initial  
account omitting more details in their subsequent interview (M = 15.05, SD = 5.30, 95% CI  
[13.76, 16.36]) than those who initially completed a WFR (M = 5.33, SD = 3.83, 95% CI  
[4.39, 6.27]). There was also a main effect for Veracity, F(1, 123) = 4.24, p = .042, f = .18,  
with truth tellers omitting more details (M = 11.02, SD = 6.88, 95% CI [9.33, 12.71]) than  
liars (M = 9.27, SD = 6.46, 95% CI [7.69, 10.85]). No significant interaction was found, F(1,  
124) = .16, p = .69. 
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Details provided in deceptive accounts. To compare the types of details that liars  
provided in their accounts, we conducted a series of independent samples t-tests. Statistical  
significance of the six t-tests was accepted at a Bonferroni-adjusted alpha level of .008, in  
order to not capitalise on probabilities. In the initial account, liars who completed the SAI  
provided more truthful details (M = 23.00, SD = 10.19, 95% CI [19.26, 26.74]) than liars who  
completed the WFR (M = 15.94, SD = 9.20, 95% CI [12.62, 19.26]), t(61) = 2.89, p = .005, d  
= .73. Liars completing the SAI provided more distorted detail in the initial account (M =  
11.68, SD = 5.86, 95% CI [9.53, 13.83]) than liars completing the WFR (M = 5.22, SD =  
3.80, 95% CI [3.85, 6.59]), t(61) = 5.20, p < .001, d = 1.31. There was no significant  
difference in the initial account between the number of fabrications reported by liars who  
completed the WFR (M = 4.69, SD = 4.22, 95% CI [3.23, 6.15]) and liars who completed the  
SAI (M = 7.26, SD = 8.00, 95% CI [4.49, 10.03]), t(61) = 1.60, p = .11. In the subsequent 
interview, we found no significant difference between the amount of distorted detail reported  
by liars who had previously completed the SAI (M = 9.84, SD = 5.09, 95% CI [7.97, 11.71])  
and liars who had previously completed the WFR (M = 7.38, SD = 4.62, 95% CI [5.71,  
9.05]), t(61) = 2.01, p = .048. We also found no significant difference between liars who  
completed the WFR (M = 7.69, SD = 8.40, 95% CI [4.78, 10.60]) or SAI (M = 7.90, SD =  
8.35, 95% CI [5.01, 10.79]) for the amount of fabricated details provided in the subsequent 
interview, t(61) = 0.10, p = .92. There was also no significant difference for the amount of  
truthful information provided by liars who completed the SAI (M = 26.48, SD = 8.67, 95%  
CI [23.47, 29.48]) and the WFR (M = 24.53, SD = 9.22, 95% CI [21.34, 27.72]) in the  
subsequent interview, t(61) = .87, p = .39. 
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Discussion  
Replicating previous findings in deception literature (DePaulo et al., 2003), truth  
tellers provided significantly more details than liars in their initial accounts and subsequent  
interviews. Truth tellers also repeated more and omitted more details in the subsequent  
interview than liars did. As truth tellers reported a greater amount of detail in the initial  
account than liars, this provided a greater opportunity for more details to be repeated and  
omitted.   
Contrary to the repeat vs reconstruct hypothesis (Granhag & Strömwall, 1999), no  
difference emerged between truth tellers and liars in the number of reminiscent details  
introduced in the subsequent interview. This may be due to the extensive nature of the  
subsequent interview, which may have exhausted the memory of all interviewees. The overall  
pattern, truth tellers repeated and omitted more details than liars did but no difference in  
reminiscences, replicates Granhag and Strömwall (2002).  
Consistent with previous research (Gabbert et al., 2009; Hope et al., 2014),  participants who 
completed the SAI reported more details in their initial account than  participants who 
completed the WFR (supporting Hypothesis 1). However, unlike Hope et al.  (2014), no 
difference was found in the amount of detail reported in the subsequent interview  by 
participants who had previously completed the SAI compared to those who had completed  
the WFR. In the subsequent interview, Hope et al. (2014) used the Cognitive Interview (CI)  
technique (which the SAI is based upon) resulting in overlap between the two interviews.  
This overlap may have allowed SAI participants to use similar processing across both  
retrieval tasks. As we did not use CI in the current experiment, it is possible that the questions  
in the subsequent interview did not facilitate SAI participants’ retrieval in the same way.   
Consistent with Gilbert and Fisher (2006), all participants provided some reminiscent  
details during their subsequent interviews, and in both the SAI and WFR conditions,  
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significantly more detail was provided in the subsequent interviews than in the initial  
accounts. These findings may be due to the change in modality from a written to a verbal  
account, as people tend to report more information when they speak than when they write  
(Elntib, Wagstaff, & Wheatcroft, 2015; Sauerland & Sporer, 2011).   
It was found that participants who initially completed a SAI repeated more details and  
omitted more details in their subsequent interviews than those completing the WFR. This is  
likely due to the greater amount of detail reported in the initial accounts prompted by the  
SAI, which gave participants more opportunity to repeat and omit details in the subsequent  
interview.   
We did not find any difference in accuracy rates during the initial account or  
subsequent interviews for truth tellers completing the SAI compared to those completing a  
WFR, and therefore no support was found for Hypothesis 2. This could be due to participants  
being informed that they needed to provide a truthful report about the event before witnessing  
it. They may have thus paid close attention to the event.   
When examining the types of detail constituting the initial deceptive accounts, it was  
found that liars completing the SAI provided more truthful details and more distorted details 
than liars completing the WFR. The current study required liars to embed their deception  
within truthful peripheral detail, as oppose to fabricate an entire scenario. This reflects real  
life better, where deceptive individuals are likely to embed their fabrications within truthful  
details (Leins, Fisher & Ross, 2013; Vrij, 2008).   
In real life interviews, interviewers would have access to the initial account to assist  
in developing an interview plan. Since SAI has been developed for, and is recommended for  
use in, incidents involving multiple witnesses, statements can be compared with other  
witnesses’ accounts (or physical evidence if available). Such comparisons would give  
investigators an idea which details reported in the SAI are truthful and which are  
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